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ABSTRACT
Across a range of legal regimes—including environmental, tort,
employment discrimination, corporate, securities, and health care law—
United States law reduces or eliminates enterprise liability for those
organizations that can demonstrate the existence of “effective” internal
compliance structures. Presumably, this legal standard rests on an assumption
that internal compliance structures reduce the incidence of prohibited
conduct within organizations. This Article demonstrates, however, that little
evidence exists to support that assumption. In fact, a growing body of
evidence indicates that internal compliance structures do not deter prohibited
conduct within firms and may largely serve a window-dressing function that
provides both market legitimacy and reduced legal liability. This leads to two
potential problems: (1) an under-deterrence of corporate misconduct, and (2)
a proliferation of costly—but arguably ineffective—internal compliance
structures.
The United States legal regime’s enthusiastic embrace of internal
compliance structures as a liability determinant is consistent with the
increasing influence of what are referred to in this Article as “negotiated
governance” models that seek to improve government regulation and/or the
litigation process through more cooperative governance methods that provide
a governance role to the regulated group and other interested parties.
Drawing on the incomplete contracts literature, this Article argues that,
although the negotiated governance model provides valuable descriptive
insights into the mechanisms by which legal rules develop, the model’s
proponents minimize the dangers of opportunistic behavior during the
renegotiation phases of governance (that is, the implementation and
enforcement phases) by those with the greatest stake in the meaning of
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incomplete law—in this case, business organizations and legal compliance
professionals, including lawyers.
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent epidemic of corporate misbehavior, including scandals at
major companies such as Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco, has been
accompanied by an almost predictable backlash against corporate greed and
immorality by industry experts, politicians, and the public at large.1 Even
President George W. Bush has joined the crusade, lamenting the “abuses”
and “excesses” of American business and declaring that “America’s greatest
economic need is higher ethical standards.”2
Not all of the renewed interest in ethical corporate conduct is mere
rhetoric. Business schools are scrambling to include more coverage of ethics
in their curriculum;3 the New York Stock Exchange recently approved new
listing standards that require all listed companies to have an internal audit
function and adopt and publish a code of business conduct and ethics;4 the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (passed in the wake of the Enron scandal)
mandates that all reporting companies file “internal control report[s]”5 and
disclose information about their ethics codes;6 and the ethics and compliance
consulting business—already a multi-billion dollar industry—has seen a
surge in demand.7 Indeed, given the present consensus that more corporate
1. For example, a recent CBS News poll revealed that only 25% of Americans believe that most
corporate executives are honest. Jenna Russell and D.C. Denison, Corporate Scandals Fail to Taint
MBA Students’ Optimism, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 2, 2002, at C5 [hereinafter Russell & Denison].
2. Bush Talks Tough on Business, BBC NEWS (July 9, 2002), at http://news.bbc.co.
uk/1/hi/business/2118162.stm. Similarly, in a July 16, 2002 speech, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan blamed “infectious greed” for the corporate governance breakdowns that had led to recent
corporate debacles. Greg Ip, Greenspan Issues Hopeful Outlook as Stocks Sink, WALL ST. J., Jul. 17,
2002, at A1.
3. Russell & Denison, supra note 1.
4. Press Release, New York Stock Exchange, NYSE Approves Measures to Strengthen
Corporate Accountability (Aug. 1, 2002), at http://www.nyse.com/press/NT00545421.html.
5. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7262 (West 2002). The internal control report must be contained in each
annual report required by section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act (the “Exchange Act”)
and “state the responsibility of management for establishing and maintaining an adequate internal
control structure and procedures for financial reporting; and . . . contain an assessment, as of the end of
the most recent fiscal year of the issuer, of the effectiveness of the internal control structure and
procedures of the issuer for financial reporting.” Id.
6. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7264 (West 2002). In each periodic report required under section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Exchange Act, reporting issuers must “disclose whether or not, and if not, the reason
therefor, such issuer has adopted a code of ethics for senior financial officers, applicable to its
principal financial officer and comptroller or principal accounting officer, or persons performing
similar functions.” Id.
7. Jan Norman, Righting Corporate Wrongs, ORANGE CO. REG., Jul. 19, 2002, at C1.
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conduct codes and internal compliance programs (referred to collectively in
this Article as “internal compliance structures”) are the remedy for America’s
recent lapse in corporate morality, the legal compliance profession (which
includes lawyers, ethics and compliance consultants, and internal compliance
and human resources personnel) appears headed for another banner decade.
Few, however, have paused to consider the reasons for—and the accuracy
of—the belief that pouring more resources into internal compliance
structures will cure what ails corporate America. In fact, the response of the
legal compliance profession (including legal academia) to the ever-growing
importance of internal compliance structures as a liability determinant has
been overwhelmingly positive.8 Relatively few commentators have made
more than a passing reference to the potential inefficiency of such a system.
This enthusiastic embrace of internal compliance structures as a liability
determinant is consistent with the increasing influence of what I refer to in
this article as “negotiated governance” models.9 Although these models vary
8. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An
Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 745-52 (1997) (arguing in favor of
the OSG liability mitigation provisions, which reduce an organizational defendant’s criminal liability
based on internal compliance structures); Charles M. Foster, Jr. et al., Compliance Programs: An
Alternative to Punitive Damages for Corporate Defendants, 49 S.C. L. REV. 247, 263-66 (1998)
(analogizing to the OSGs and urging courts to impose mandatory internal compliance structures,
instead of punitive damages, on corporate defendants); Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis,
Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes Of Conduct,
78 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1647 (1990) (arguing that “corporate self-regulation provides a superior alternative
to tort or criminal liability as a means of effecting society’s expectations of business”) [hereinafter Pitt
& Groskaufmanis]; Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Corporate Compliance Programs as a Defense
to Criminal Liability: Can a Corporation Save its Soul?, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 605, 607-08 (1995)
(arguing that corporate compliance programs should insulate organizations from criminal liability);
Note, Growing the Carrot: Encouraging Effective Corporate Compliance, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1783,
1794-95 (1996) (arguing that the OSG’s do not go far enough in rewarding corporations for
compliance efforts and advocating “a program that would allow corporations to apply for amnesty
status, with approval contingent upon the existence of a satisfactory compliance program”) [hereinafter
Note]. See also infra notes 103-13 and accompanying text (discussing scholarship advocating
negotiated governance).
9. A variety of terms are used to describe these governance models, including: “contractarian,”
“collaborative,” “experimentalist,” “problem solving,” “empowered participatory,” “enforced selfgovernance,” “responsive regulation,” “set of negotiated relationships,” and “government-stakeholder
network structures.” See, e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 4-6
(1992) (employing the phrases “responsive regulation” and “enforced self-governance”) [hereinafter
Ayres & Braithwaite]; David A. Dana, The New “Contractarian” Paradigm in Environmental
Regulation, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 35, 36 (2000) (referring to a “contractarian” governance model);
Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 886 (2003)
(referring to “experimentalist” or “problem solving” legal institutions) [hereinafter Dorf]; Jody
Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 22 (1997)
(adopting the phrase “collaborative” governance) [hereinafter Freeman, Collaborative Governance];
Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 571 (2000) (referring
to governance as a “set of negotiated relationships”) [hereinafter Freeman, Private Role]; Richard B.
Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 448 (2003)
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in their particulars, each purports to increase the effectiveness of government
regulation and/or the litigation process through more cooperative governance
methods that permit a voice to the regulated group and other interested
private parties.10
Although this Article does not adopt public choice theory’s radically
negative view of private influence on the governance process, neither does it
accept the benign view of private influence embodied in most variations of
the negotiated governance model. Instead, this Article argues that, although
negotiated governance may well have the capacity to enhance regulatory
efficiency under some circumstances, it does not currently achieve that goal
in broad and important areas of the law that govern organizational conduct.11
This failure is particularly clear when one carefully examines the role of one
form of negotiated governance—the use of internal compliance structures as
a liability determinant—in the United States legal regime.
As discussed in Part III of this Article, in many instances, United States
(discussing “government-stakeholder network structures”); Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright,
Thinking About Empowered Participatory Governance 3, in DEEPENING DEMOCRACY (Archon Fung
& Eirk Olin Wright eds., 2003); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A
Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 475 (2001) (referring to “problem solving” regulation)
[hereinafter Sturm]. I adopt the phrase “negotiated governance” model to collectively refer to these
theories in order to further the contractual metaphor used throughout this Article—and in Part VI, in
particular—to analyze the governance process. “Negotiated governance,” however, should be
distinguished from “negotiated rulemaking,” a form of administrative rulemaking established by the
Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (1994). Although negotiated rulemaking is
one form of negotiated governance, the phrase “negotiated governance” encompasses much more than
negotiated administrative rulemaking, as discussed infra in notes 103-13 and accompanying text.
10. Because this Article addresses only the application of negotiated governance models to the
control of business organizations, the phrase “regulated group” as used in this Article refers to
business organizations. Many commentators, however, envision negotiated governance as much
broader, providing guidance for the regulation of other parties, such as criminal defendants. See, e.g.,
Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist
Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831 (2000) (discussing criminal defendants with known drug
problems); Dorf, supra note 9, at 965-80 (discussing the Supreme Court’s treatment of coercive
interrogations). Although not addressed in this Article, it is possible that the conclusions here
regarding the failures of negotiated governance with respect to the regulation of business organizations
would not apply to the regulation of groups with less economic and political power, such as criminal
defendants. However, these conclusions may well hold true for regulation and litigation affecting other
powerful interests, such as doctors, lawyers, and other professionals—groups that are not only well
organized but have access to capital and political influence as well.
11. It is worth emphasizing that the claim of this Article is not that negotiated governance in all
instances is doomed to failure. Instead, my argument is that internal compliance-based organizational
liability regimes are one (quickly growing) example of negotiated governance, and that the existing
empirical evidence regarding the effectiveness of internal compliance structures as deterrence
mechanisms should cast doubt on the widespread adoption by the legal system (and enthusiasm by
legal scholars) of such liability regimes. Although other forms of negotiated governance may prove
more effective, the poor empirical showing of internal compliance structures as a means of deterring
organizational misconduct should cause more skepticism than evidenced in the legal and management
literature.
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law reduces or eliminates enterprise liability for those organizations that can
demonstrate the existence of “effective” internal compliance structures.12
Presumably, this legal standard stems from an assumption that internal
compliance structures reduce the incidence of prohibited conduct within
organizations. This Article demonstrates, however, that little evidence exists
to support that assumption. In fact, a growing body of evidence indicates that
internal compliance structures do not deter prohibited conduct within firms,
and may largely serve a window-dressing function that provides both market
legitimacy and reduced legal liability.
This is not to imply that internal compliance structures are inherently bad
or that all American corporations are centers for uncontrolled illegality. Most
corporate managers no doubt have a genuine commitment to monitoring,
detecting, and preventing legal violations within their firms, and may use
their internal compliance structures to further that goal. Furthermore, this
Article does not suggest that a focus on corporate ethics is misplaced, or that
the legal system should not attempt to encourage ethical corporate conduct
whenever possible.
Instead, this Article argues that the present legal regime, which places an
overwhelming and steadily increasing importance on internal compliance
structures as a liability determinant, raises potential dangers of
underenforcement and social waste that have been largely unaddressed in the
legal literature. The inherent danger posed by a legal system that is overly
reliant on internal compliance structures as a liability determinant stems from
the extraordinarily favorable legal treatment received by organizations that
adopt such systems, and the correspondingly harsh legal treatment of
organizations without them. This leads to two potential problems: (1) an
under-deterrence of corporate misconduct and (2) a proliferation of costly—
but arguably ineffective—internal compliance structures.
First, the current legal regime’s extremely favorable treatment of
companies with internal compliance structures may result in an underdeterrence of prohibited corporate misconduct and a frustration of the
normative goals of legal rules.13 This is because the indicia of an effective
12. Under the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, effective internal compliance structures are
those that are “reasonably designed, implemented, and enforced so that [they] generally will be
effective in preventing and detecting criminal conduct. Failure to prevent or detect the instant offense,
by itself, does not mean that the program was not effective.” U.S. ORGANIZATIONAL SENTENCING
MANUAL § 8A1.2(k) (2001). The Manual goes on to list the minimum steps that the organization must
have taken in order to qualify for consideration of a reduced sentence. Id. See infra notes 18-25 and
accompanying text (discussing the OSG minimum steps for effective internal compliance).
13. This assumes, first, that the purpose of the legal rule in question is substantive, rather than
cosmetic. For example, if Congress thought that recent market downturns were due solely to an
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compliance system are easily mimicked and true effectiveness is difficult for
courts and regulators to determine, particularly ex post. As a result, firms
engaged in legally prohibited, but potentially profitable, conduct can reduce
or eliminate firm-level liability (and give the appearance of legitimacy to
corporate stakeholders and the marketplace at large, thus reducing market
sanctions for failures to comply with expected behavioral norms) by
mimicking an effective compliance system, without reducing the incidence
of prohibited conduct within the firm.14
Second, the harsh treatment under current law of companies without
internal compliance structures (or with less extensive structures than the
industry standard) has caused a proliferation of costly—but potentially
ineffective—internal compliance structures.15 This is because even
organizations with a genuine commitment to legal compliance, as evidenced
irrational loss of investor confidence, then the ethics code and internal control provisions of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act may have been viewed as cost-effective mechanisms for luring investors back into
the stock market while at the same time disrupting normal business practices as little as possible. This,
however, assumes a degree of investor naïveté that is inconsistent with most theories of market
conduct. Second, some laws may be so ill-advised that under-enforcement, or non-enforcement, would
benefit society. Nonetheless, an insistence on internal compliance structures as a liability determinant
remains a particularly costly means of non-enforcement.
14. See Kimberly D. Elsbach, The Architecture of Legitimacy 391, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
LEGITIMACY (John T. Jost & Brenda Major eds., 2001) (arguing that firms may use legitimacy as a
tool to attract and retain important stakeholders, such as employees, customers, industry analysts,
media representatives, and investors). Firms might choose to implement ineffective compliance
systems for two basic reasons. First, legal violations may be profitable if the legal system underenforces, either because penalties are set too low or because detection is imperfect. See Donald C.
Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance with Law, 2002
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 80 (2002) [hereinafter Langevoort, Monitoring]; Kimberly D. Krawiec,
Accounting for Greed: Unraveling the Rogue Trader Mystery, 79 OR. L. REV. 301 (2000) [hereinafter
Krawiec]. Second, ineffective compliance may represent a principal-agent problem in which the
management agents derive the benefits of misconduct, but suffer few of the losses. Langevoort,
Monitoring, supra, at 80.
15. Organizations currently invest substantial resources in various types of internal compliance
structures. See, e.g., Richard S. Allen & Kendyl A. Montgomery, Applying an Organizational
Development Approach to Creating Diversity, 30 (2) ORG. DYNAMICS 149, 151 (2001) (stating that
“U.S. companies spend an estimated $200 to $300 million a year on diversity training programs” that
“meet with mixed results or even failure”); P.E. Murphy, Corporate Ethics Statements: Current Status
and Future Prospects, 14 J. BUS. ETHICS 727 (1995) (stating that since the 1970s, “corporations have
invested a substantial amount of energy in revising their ethics statements”); Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A.
Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability: A Second Look at Corporate
Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1634 (1990) (stating that “adopting corporate codes (and the
compliance programs that inevitably accompany them) is costly”).
As might be expected, numerous legal compliance professionals have arisen to fill this demand.
See, e.g., HELEN HEMPHILL & RAY HAINES, DISCRIMINATION, HARASSMENT, AND THE FAILURE OF
DIVERSITY TRAINING: WHAT TO DO NOW 4 (1997) [hereinafter HEMPHILL & HAINES] (stating that
more than 5000 diversity trainers and consultants were in existence in 1995, and discussing interviews
with human resource managers who reported receiving up to thirty brochures a week from diversity
specialists).
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by top management’s dedication to ethical corporate behavior, a corporate
culture that reflects that commitment, and an incentive structure that is
compatible with and reinforces the goal of legal compliance, are forced to
adopt costly additional internal compliance structures in order to avoid the
risk of harsh penalties when violations occur—as they inevitably will for any
large organization, management’s good intentions notwithstanding.16
Because internal compliance structures are a liability determinant in so
many legal regimes, this realization has important implications for a wide
variety of fields, including environmental, tort, employment discrimination,
corporate, securities, and health care law. This Article, however, will focus
primarily on the impact of compliance-based liability determinants in three
legal fields: organizational sentencing under the Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines (the “OSGs”); enterprise and director liability under corporate
and securities law, including the recent modifications made by the SarbanesOxley Act; and employer liability under equal employment opportunity
(“EEO”) law.17
This Article pays special attention to the development of internal
compliance-based liability standards under EEO law because compliance16. Each of these factors—management’s commitment to corporate ethics, organizational
culture, and institutional incentive structure—have been determined to significantly influence the level
of organizational misconduct. See, e.g., MARSHALL CLINARD, CORPORATE ETHICS AND CRIME: THE
ROLE OF MIDDLE MANAGEMENT 132-36 (1983) (finding that, in interviews with 64 retired managers
of Fortune 500 corporations, behavior and philosophy of top management was most commonly
asserted as the primary reason for illegal employee behavior); Jeff Allen & Duane Davis, Assessing
Some Determinant Effects of Ethical Consulting Behavior: The Case of Personal and Professional
Values, 12(6) J. BUS. ETHICS 449 (1998) (finding that corporate culture and reward systems—rather
than ethics codes—impact employee behavior); Anita Jose & Mary S. Thibodeux, Institutionalization
of Ethics: The Perspectives of Managers, 22 J. BUS. ETHICS 133, 139 (1999) (finding that 98.8% of
managers surveyed ranked top management support and that 93% ranked corporate culture above
factors such as conduct codes and training programs as important in encouraging ethical corporate
conduct); Gary R. Weaver et al., Integrated and Decoupled Corporate Social Performance:
Managerial Commitments, External Pressures, Corporate Ethical Practices, 42(5) ACADEMY OF
MGMT. J. 539, 547 (1999) (finding that top management support for ethics programs is more important
in deterring misconduct than are external forces such as the OSGs, which tend to promote only formal
window dressing changes, including ethics codes, that are not integrated into organizational activities).
Other statistically significant factors include: financial pressure, organizational size, complexity, and
decentralization, and industry concentration. See, e.g., Marie McKendall et al., Ethical Compliance
Programs and Corporate Illegality: Testing the Assumptions of the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines,
37 J. BUS. ETHICS 367, 376 (2002) (finding that lower firm profitability is positively associated with
firm OSHA violations) and at 368 (discussing earlier studies that find illegal activity is more likely in
firms facing financial pressure) [hereinafter McKendall et al.]; Marie A. McKendall & John A.
Wagner, III, Motive, Opportunity, Choice, and Corporate Illegality, 8(6) ORG. SCI. 624, 644 (1997)
(finding that organizational size, structure, complexity, and industry concentration are significant
factors in predicting corporate illegality).
17. EEO law includes Title VII, as well as other relevant anti-discrimination statutes such as the
Americans with Disabilities Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. See infra note 52.
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based liability has developed more quickly in the EEO field, has been
litigated more often, and has been subject to more empirical testing by
academic researchers in a variety of fields, including law, economics,
sociology, and psychology. As a result, these EEO legal developments and
the academic commentary assessing them hold great importance for other
legal regimes that regulate organizational conduct.
This Article also seeks to explain the means by which a governance
mechanism so consistent with the precepts of the negotiated governance
model could produce a result so inconsistent with that model’s predictions of
more effective governance. As will be explained, consistent with the
negotiated governance model, the governance process may be usefully
analyzed as a series of repeated interactions in which a variety of groups with
a stake in the governance process—including courts, legislatures, regulatory
agencies (collectively, “policy makers”), the regulated group (in this case,
business organizations), private interest groups, and legal compliance
professionals—negotiate the meaning of ambiguous or incomplete law. To
borrow the contractual metaphor employed by other legal scholars, analyzing
the governance process as a set of related contracts is a useful analytical tool
that highlights the roles played by the aforementioned groups in collectively
constructing law.
Because any law—like any contract—is necessarily incomplete, however,
these actors are left to fill in legal gaps during the implementation and
enforcement phases of governance, creating an opening for opportunistic
behavior that may appropriate any social gains created by new legal
standards and frustrate the normative goals of law. In particular, this gapfilling process proves to be an important mechanism by which various actors
outside of the regulated organization (for example, lawyers and consultants)
and within it (for example, senior management, division managers, internal
compliance and human resources personnel, and in-house legal departments)
advance their own interests. As a result, large segments of the internal
compliance-based liability regime can be attributed to the gap-filling of
incomplete law with terms favorable to those parties most influential in this
gap-filling process: organizational defendants and legal compliance
professionals.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part II.A discusses the
internal compliance structures commonly employed by business
organizations, which tend to mirror the recommendations of the OSGs. Part
II.B then presents a brief history of the rise of compliance as an industry,
beginning with the defense contracting scandal of the 1980s and its impact
on the OSGs, which were developed shortly thereafter. Part III discusses the
role of internal compliance structures in other parts of the U.S. legal regime,
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concentrating specifically on corporate and securities law in Part III.A, and
on employment discrimination law in Part III.B.
Part IV demonstrates that, despite the legal regime’s heavy reliance on
internal compliance structures as a liability determinant, little evidence exists
concerning their effectiveness as deterrence mechanisms. Part IV then
analyzes the empirical evidence relating to three types of internal compliance
structures—ethics codes, the OSG-recommended internal compliance
structures, and diversity training—and concludes that insufficient evidence
exists as to their effectiveness to support the legal regime’s embrace of such
structures as liability mitigators.
Part V locates the rise of internal compliance structures as an important
feature of the U.S. legal regime within the broader negotiated governance
literature, arguing that the negotiated governance model provides important
descriptive insights into the development of much legal policy. Part VI
demonstrates, however, that to the extent governance is properly understood
as a set of related contracts or negotiated relationships, such contracts and
relationships are highly incomplete. Insights from the literature on
incomplete contracts thus implies that these incomplete contractual
relationships present the danger of rent-seeking behavior by private parties
during renegotiation—that is, during the implementation and enforcement
phases of governance.
Part VII ties together the Incomplete Contracts Governance Theory
developed in Part VI and the analysis of internal compliance structures as a
liability determinant developed in Parts III and IV through a specific
illustration: the rise of grievance procedures as a liability mitigator under
EEO law. Part VIII concludes.
II. COMPLIANCE AS AN INDUSTRY
A. Internal Compliance Structures Defined
The internal compliance structures adopted by most business
organizations share several common features, which are derived from the
OSGs’ minimum requirements for an effective compliance program.18 First,
an effective internal compliance structure contains a written ethics code or
similar code of conduct that sets forth the ostensible limits of acceptable
18. McKendall et al., supra note 16, at 372 (stating that “[t]he kinds of ethical compliance
programs detailed in the Sentencing Guidelines mirror the type of advice that has been offered to
organizations about how to promote the type of ethical climate that will positively affect employee
behavior.”).
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behavior within the firm.19 Many corporate codes of conduct also describe
mechanisms of code enforcement, such as internal reporting and information
gathering, policies regarding the investigation of reported violations,
whistleblowing procedures and policies for protecting whistleblowers against
retaliation, and internal procedures and sanctions for conduct or ethics code
violations.20 In addition, many organizations also have an EEO code that sets
forth the organization’s commitment to equal hiring practices.
Second, the organization must take steps to ensure that the code is
communicated to employees and other agents, for example, through training
programs designed to familiarize personnel with the code, and/or through
dissemination and publication of the code.21 Common mechanisms for
dissemination include company newsletters, employee manuals, and
organization websites.22 In the EEO context, this commonly takes the form of
diversity or “sensitivity” training.
Third, an effective internal compliance structure will contain monitoring
and auditing systems reasonably designed to detect prohibited conduct by
employees and other agents.23 Fourth, effective internal compliance requires
the presence of a reporting system that enables employees to report violations
of the conduct code or of laws and regulations by others within the
organization without fear of reprisal.24 In the EEO context, this may take the
form of internal grievance procedures, adopted by many organizations as a
forum through which employees can voice their concerns about
discriminatory conduct. Finally, specific, high-level personnel within the
organization must have responsibility for oversight of compliance with the
conduct code.25
19. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2(k)(1) (2001).
20. Andrew Brien, Regulating Virtue: Formulating, Engendering and Enforcing Corporate
Ethical Codes, 15(1) BUS. & PROFESSIONAL ETHICS J. 21 (1996) [hereinafter Brien]; Richard S.
Gruner, Developing Judicial Standards for Evaluating Compliance Programs: Insights from EEO
Litigations, 1317 PLI/CORP. 162, 169 (2002) [hereinafter Gruner].
21. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2(k)(4) (2001).
22. Gruner, supra note 20, at 177.
23. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2(k)(5) (2001).
24. Id.
25. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2(k)(2) (2001). Other necessary minimum
steps listed in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual include: the organization must have used due
care not to delegate authority to employees with a propensity to engage in illegal activities; once a
violation has been detected, the organization must take all reasonable steps to respond appropriately to
the offense and to prevent further similar offenses; and the code of conduct must have been
consistently enforced. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2(k) (2001).
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B. A Short History—The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines
Although one could argue that the “compliance industry” began, not with
business, but with government in the wake of the Watergate scandal,26 the
real rise of compliance as big business is usually traced to the defense
contracting scandal of the mid-1980s.27 With the disclosures by a defense
department whistle-blower of fraud, overbilling, and kickbacks by
government defense contractors, fifty-five contractors agreed to adopt ethics
codes and internal ethics officers, in a largely successful effort to fend off
federal regulators.28
The agreement, termed the Defense Industry Initiative (or, “DII”)
required each of the signatories to:
[A]dopt a written code of conduct, to conduct employees orientation
and training with respect to the code, to provide employees with a
mechanism (such as a hotline or helpline) to surface concerns about
corporate compliance with procurement laws and regulations, to adopt
procedures for voluntary disclosure of violations of federal
procurement laws, to participate in best practices forums, and to make
public information which shows the commitment to do all of these
things.29
Shortly after implementation of the DII, the U.S. Sentencing Commission
began debate on the OSGs, and representatives of the DII testified before the
26. PETER W. MORGAN & GLENN H. REYNOLDS, THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY 73-98
(1997) [hereinafter MORGAN & REYNOLDS].
27. Lisa Girion, Interest in Corporate Ethics is Still Weak, L.A. TIMES, July 8, 2002, at C1
[hereinafter Girion]. See also The Defense Industry Initiative on Business Ethics and Conduct, Origins
and Development of the Defense Industry Initiative, at http://www.dii.org/annual/2000/origins.html.
Harvey Pitt and Karl Groskaufmanis, however, attribute the rise of internal compliance structures to
the price-fixing scandals in the heavy electrical equipment industry in the 1960s and to Judge J. Cullen
Ganey’s sentencing of General Electric, in particular. See Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 8, at 158082.
28. Girion, supra note 27; Andy Pasztor & Lucette Lagnado, Health Care: Ethics Czar Aims to
Heal Columbia, WALL ST. J., Nov. 26, 1997, at B1 [hereinafter Pasztor & Lagnado].
29. DEFENSE INDUSTRY INITIATIVE ON BUSINESS ETHICS AND CONDUCT, 2000 ANNUAL REPORT
1 (2000). The impetus for the DII arguably came from the February 28, 1986 Interim Report of the
Packard Commission, which stated, “defense contractors must promulgate and vigilantly enforce codes
of ethics that address the unique problems and procedures incident to defense procurement. They must
also develop and implement internal controls to monitor these codes of ethics and sensitive aspects of
contract compliance.” Id. at 1-2.
The DII was later copied by other troubled industries, including the health care industry, which
has been plagued repeatedly by Medicare fraud and drug company kickback scandals. Pasztor &
Lagnado, supra note 28. Interestingly, Alan Yuspeh, a primary engineer of the defense industry
initiative, was also the drafter of some of the medical industry voluntary-compliance efforts. Id.
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Commission as to the content and impact of the DII model.30 A few years
later, in 1991, the compliance industry received its most important boost
when the U.S. Sentencing Commission passed the OSGs (referred to by
some industry insiders as “The Ethics Consultants Full Employment Act of
1991”).31
For all practical purposes, the OSGs require companies to adopt internal
compliance structures, by substantially reducing the penalties imposed on
companies with such programs that are convicted of a federal crime, and
substantially increasing the penalties on companies without them.32 The
Commission was clearly influenced by the DII experience, as the OSGs bear
a striking resemblance to the DII terms.
Interestingly, early drafts of the OSGs contained no provision for penalty
reduction based on internal compliance structures. Instead, during the
comment period from 1987 to 1991, the Commission initially explored two
competing proposals: (1) a “just punishment” regime, based on the
Commission’s guidelines for individual defendants, that considered indicia of
organizational culpability, such as top management involvement in the crime
and organizational attempts to discipline culpable employees prior to
indictment; and (2) a law and economics-based “optimal deterrence”
approach that would equate the organization’s financial penalty to the social
harm caused by the conduct, reduced by the probability of detection.33 Both
proposals were eventually determined to be unworkable,34 and ultimately
were rejected in favor of a regime that provides substantial incentives for
organizations to adopt internal compliance structures—incentives for which
the business community, including the Business Roundtable, lobbied hard.35
30. DEFENSE INDUSTRY INITIATIVE ON BUSINESS ETHICS AND CONDUCT, 2000 ANNUAL REPORT
27-28 (2000).
31. MORGAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 26, at 101 (quoting from an Aug. 14, 1996 interview with
Frank Nauron, Ethics Resource Center, Washington, D.C.).
32. Paula Desio (Deputy General Counsel to the United States Sentencing Commission), An
Overview of the Organizational Guidelines, United States Sentencing Commission, available at
http://www.ussc.gov/TRAINING/corpover.PDF; Michele Galen, Keeping the Long Arm of the Law at
Arm’s Length, BUS. WK., Apr. 22, 1991, at 104 (quoting Professor John C. Coffee as stating that, in
light of the OSGs, a failure by general counsel to implement an internal compliance program
constitutes professional malpractice).
33. John R. Steer, Changing Organizational Behavior—The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Experiment Begins to Bear Fruit (unpublished paper presented at the Twenty-Ninth Annual
Conference on Value Inquiry, Tulsa, OK (Apr. 26, 2001)), available at 1317 PLI/CORP. 113 (2002)
[hereinafter Steer]. John R. Steer is the Vice-Chair of the United States Sentencing Commission.
34. The optimal deterrence proposal, in particular, proved difficult to implement, given the
inability to accurately quantify all social harm, and the lack of reliable empirical data on the
probability of detection for various offenses. Id.
35. Jeffrey M. Kaplan, The Sentencing Guidelines: The First Ten Years (2001), available at
http://www.singerpubs.com/ethikos/kaplan%20_Guidelines%2010%20years.htm (reprinted from the
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The OSGs set financial penalties for organizations convicted of a crime
by establishing a base fine, which is then multiplied by a culpability score.36
As organizational culpability increases or decreases, the base fine is
multiplied by a multiplier ranging from .05 to 4.37 As a result, the fine may
be reduced to one-twentieth or increased by 400% of the original amount.
The convicted organization’s internal compliance structures are
extraordinarily important in reducing the culpability multiplier, because
courts are instructed to reduce or increase the multiplier based on mitigating
or aggravating factors, including whether the organization possessed an
“effective program to detect and prevent violations of the law.”38 Assuming
the absence of any aggravating factors (such as the involvement of high-level
personnel in the violation or a prior history of similar misconduct), the
implementation of effective internal compliance structures will reduce the
organization’s culpability score by three points, resulting in a significant
reduction of the multiplier and a corresponding reduction of the fine by up to
sixty percent.39
Nov./Dec. 2001 issue of ETHIKOS); McKendall et al., supra note 16, at 370 (discussing pressure from
the business community to adopt guidelines that accounted for organizations’ internal compliance
structures). See generally William S. Lofquist, Legislating Organizational Probation: State Capacity,
Business Power, and Corporate Crime Control, 27 L. & SOC’Y REV. 741 (1993) (discussing the
lobbying activity of the Business Roundtable, National Association of Manufacturers, Chamber of
Commerce, numerous corporations, and other interested public and private groups in connection with
the OSGs).
36. The base fine is set at the greatest of: (1) the amount determined from the OSG “Offense
Level Fine Table,” which sets forth base fines ranging from $5000 to $72,500, (2) the pecuniary gain
to the corporation resulting from the illegal conduct, or (3) the pecuniary loss caused by the offense, to
the extent that the offense was committed intentionally, recklessly, or knowingly. U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.4(a)(d) (2001).
37. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.6 (2001).
38. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5 (2001). Other culpability factors include:
(1) tolerance of or participation in the offense by high-level personnel, (2) the organization’s prior
history of similar misconduct, (3) the level of organizational cooperation in the investigation, (4)
voluntary self-reporting of the violation, and (5) whether the organization accepted responsibility for
the illegal conduct. Id.
39. Id. As previously discussed, the official comments to the OSGs define the minimum factors
necessary for an organization’s internal compliance structures to be considered “effective,” and thus
qualify for a reduced sentence. See supra notes 18-25 and accompanying text (discussing the minimum
factors).
From 1994-2001, only two organizations received sentencing mitigation based on the existence of
an effective internal compliance program. See Organizations Sentenced Under Chapter Eight:
Culpability Factors, Tables 47-54, available at http://www.usc.gov/corp/orgizsp.htm. This should not,
however, be construed either as evidence that the OSGs have been unsuccessful in inducing
organizations to adopt internal compliance structures or as evidence that the OSG-recommended
internal compliance structures have been so successful in reducing misconduct that few organizations
that adopt such structures violate the law. In fact, survey data indicates that the OSGs have been a
major influence in corporate decisions to implement internal compliance structures and the empirical
evidence shows no correlation between the OSG-recommended internal compliance structures and
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III. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
The OSGs’ internal compliance-based approach to deterring
organizational misconduct was quickly emulated in other legal fields. As a
result, although the OSGs were the first, and in that sense, most important,
legal incentive for the widespread adoption of internal compliance structures,
today a wide array of civil, criminal, and regulatory provisions encourage the
implementation of such structures.
For example, both the Environmental Protection Agency (the “EPA”) and
the Department of Health and Human Services (the “HHS”) borrow heavily
from the OSGs’ internal compliance-based liability regime in recent policies
and guidelines. Specifically, each allows for reduced civil penalties and, in
some cases, recommends no criminal penalties, for companies with effective
internal compliance structures.40 Furthermore, the HHS guidelines for
determining the effectiveness of compliance efforts are modeled after the
OSGs’ minimum steps for an effective internal compliance program.41 More
informally, the Justice Department considers firms’ internal compliance
reduced organizational misconduct. See 2000 Ethics Officers Association Member Survey (Public
Version), available at http://www.eoa.org/Research/survey_2k.html (indicating that 53% of survey
respondents listed “In response to Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations” as a factor that
had “a lot of influence” on the organization’s commitment to ethics) [hereinafter 2000 Ethics Officers
Association Member Survey]. See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text (reviewing the empirical
data concerning the effectiveness of the OSGs in deterring legal violations).
Instead, the most likely explanation for this result is that the overwhelming majority of
organizations that are criminally convicted and sentenced under the OSGs are small corporations that
often do not have the resources to invest in internal compliance and are ineligible for mitigation in any
event because of senior management involvement in the misconduct. Large organizations, by contrast,
typically have invested substantial resources in internal compliance structures and are generally able to
negotiate a civil settlement or plea agreement. An examination of these agreements demonstrates that
the organization’s internal compliance structures play an important role in this process. See 2000
Ethics Officers Association Member Survey, supra; Steer, supra note 33, at 131.
40. See Policy Statement on Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction, and
Prevention of Violations, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,618 (Apr. 11, 2000). The HHS Guidelines, which are
contained in separate industry-specific documents, may be accessed at http://oig.hhs.gov/faud/
complianceguidance.html (providing links to compliance program guidance for, among others,
pharmaceutical manufacturers, ambulance suppliers, nursing facilities, hospitals, and “Medicare +
choice” organizations) [hereinafter HHS Guidelines].
41. See id. The Office of the Inspector General of HHS has also required substantial adoptions of
internal compliance structures by organizations settling health care fraud charges. As stated by two
recent commentators:
These Agencies [the Department of Justice and HHS] have recently required all organizations
settling health care fraud charges to adopt government-supervised corporate integrity programs as
part of the defendants’ settlement agreements. These government-imposed compliance programs
usually require corporations to commit substantial assets to compliance and involve significant
government and private oversight.
Thomas E. Bartrum & L. Edward Bryant, Jr., The Brave New World of Health Care Compliance
Programs 6 ANNALS OF HEALTH L. 51, 55 (1997).
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efforts both before and after the violation in determining whether to
criminally charge organizations for the acts of their employees and agents,
and state Attorneys General take corporate internal compliance structures
into account in enforcement decisions.42
The Judiciary has jumped aboard the compliance bandwagon as well,
providing companies with more incentives to engage in internal compliance.
For example, internal compliance structures may be relevant in determining
whether the employee’s conduct was undertaken with an intent to benefit the
corporation and thus in deciding enterprise-level civil punitive or criminal
liability. The defense may be established through evidence that the corporate
defendant had in place ethics codes prohibiting the conduct in question and
compliance programs ostensibly designed to detect violations.43 Business
organizations are also often required to implement internal compliance
structures as part of civil or criminal settlements.44
Finally, internal compliance structures may be a useful device for
demonstrating the organization’s attempts to comply with legal rules, thus
painting the firm as the victim—as opposed to the perpetrator—of
42. Memorandum written by Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder, Bringing Criminal Charges
Against Corporations (June 16, 1999), at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/policy/
Chargingcorps.html; Woo, Self Policing Can Pay Off for Companies, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 1993, at
B5.
43. See, e.g., U.S. v. Beusch, 596 F.2d. 871, 878 (4th Cir. 1979) (stating, “a corporation may be
liable for acts of its employees done contrary to express instructions and policies, but that the existence
of such instructions and policies may be considered in determining whether the employee in fact acted
to benefit the corporation”); Lowry’s Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 2003 WL 21635302, at *6
(D.Md. 2003) (holding, “[t]he fact that Legg Mason’s employees infringed Lowry’s copyrights in
contravention of policy or order bears not on Legg Mason’s liability, but rather on the amount of
statutory and punitive damages and the award of attorneys’ fees”); In re Exxon Valdez, 1995 WL
527990, at *11 (D.Al. 1995) (upholding jury instructions that "you must consider whether the actions
of employees were in violation of direct . . . policies of the defendant corporation" in assessing the
corporation’s liability for punitive damages); JEFFREY M. KAPLAN ET AL., COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS
AND THE CORPORATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 20:9 (2002) (stating, “[c]ompliance programs have
also found their way into jury instructions on the issue of whether an errant employee's actions were
intended to benefit the corporation, a necessary element of vicarious liability for the corporations
[sic].”). But see U.S. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 882 F.2d 656, 660 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding
that although internal compliance structures are one factor that may mitigate corporate criminal
liability for the acts of employee agents, “Fox’s compliance program, however extensive, does not
immunize the corporation from liability when its employees, acting within the scope of their authority,
fail to comply with the law and the consent decree.”).
44. See, e.g., John Hechinger, Merrill to Pay New Hampshire a $500,000 Fine, WALL ST. J., Jul.
19, 2002, at C7 (disclosing the terms of a Merill Lynch settlement for the acts of an employee broker
under which Merill must pay a $500,000 fine and hire a consulting firm to review its compliance
programs); John R. Wilke & Don Clark, Despite Settlement, Microsoft Faces More Legal Challenges,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 2002, at A1 (reporting on the terms of an antitrust settlement that, among other
things, requires Microsoft to establish a compliance committee consisting of at least three members of
its outside board and to appoint an internal compliance officer). See also infra note 53 and
accompanying text (discussing compliance-based remedies as settlements in discrimination suits).
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misconduct. This scapegoating defense has been especially common, though
not always successful, in connection with various “rogue trading” scandals.45
A. Corporate and Securities Law
Corporate and securities laws also provide some incentive for the
implementation of internal compliance structures. Section 15(b)(4)(E) of the
Securities Exchange Act, for example, authorizes the SEC to suspend or
revoke the registration of any broker/dealer that “has failed reasonably to
supervise, with a view to preventing violations of the provisions of [the
securities or commodities laws], another person who commits such a
violation, if such other person is subject to his supervision.”46 This
supervisory requirement is deemed to be met, however, so long as
procedures reasonably designed to detect and prevent violations have been
implemented.47 Similar provisions are contained in the Commodity
Exchange Act and in the self-regulatory organization (“SRO”) rules.48
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 significantly expands the importance of
internal compliance structures in securities law. The Act and SEC rules
implementing it, for example, require the disclosure of information relating
to internal controls over financial reporting, the company’s conduct and
45. Krawiec, supra note 14, at 306-07 (arguing that management of financial firms may
purposely foster an institutional culture that promotes rogue trading, because that same culture results
in more profitable traders); Randall Smith & Susan Pulliam, IPO ‘Rogue’ Battles to Clear His Name,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2002, at C1 (reporting on an imprisoned broker, who—although his employer,
CSFB, alleges that he is a “rogue” who violated firm policies—claims that he is the company’s
scapegoat); Michael Lim Choo San & Nicky Tan Ng Kuang, The Report of the Inspectors Appointed
By The Minister For Finance on Baring Futures (Singapore) Pte Ltd. at B.iv (Sept. 7, 1995) (finding,
“[Baring’s] claim that it was unaware that account 88888 existed, and also that the sum of S$1.7
billion which the Baring Group had remitted to BFS, was to meet the margins required for trades
transacted through this account, if true, gives rise to a strong inference that key individuals of the
Baring Group’s management were grossly negligent, or wilfully [sic] blind and reckless to the truth.”).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (2000).
47. Id. Section 15(b)(4)(E) of the Securities Exchange Act provides:
No person shall be deemed to have failed reasonably to supervise any other
person, if—
(i) there have been established procedures, and a system for applying such procedures, which
would reasonably be expected to prevent and detect, insofar as practicable, any such violation by
such other person, and
(ii) such person has reasonably discharged the duties and obligations incumbent upon him by
reason of such procedures and system without reasonable cause to believe that such procedures
and system were not being complied with.
Id.
48. See, e.g., NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. III, § 27 (requiring NASD members to establish
and maintain a system to supervise employees); N.Y. Stock Exchange Rule 342.21 (requiring that
trades be subjected to review procedures); Chicago Board of Options Exchange Rules 4.2 and 9.8; 17
C.F.R. § 166.3 (2000).
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ethics codes, and whether the company has an audit committee meeting
certain criteria.49
In addition, under the Delaware Chancery Court’s 1996 Caremark
decision, corporate directors may face civil liability for failures to implement
internal compliance structures.50 Although this liability risk may by slight, it
has been argued that corporate boards—at the urging of legal professionals—
may have overestimated the risk of personal liability.51
B. Employment Discrimination
Despite the importance of the OSGs, the legal arena that perhaps has had
the greatest impact on the implementation of internal compliance structures is
the employment discrimination area, especially the law of workplace
harassment.52 Because compliance-based liability standards are developing
more quickly in the employment discrimination field than elsewhere, there
has been greater judicial and academic assessment of the success of a
49. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7262, 7264, 7265 (West 2002). See also 17 C.F.R. § 229.308 (2003); 17
C.F.R. § 229.406 (2003) and § 229.401 (2003).
50. In re Caremark Inc. Int’l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996) (holding that
in order to receive business judgment rule protection, directors must “exercise a good faith judgment
that the corporation’s information and reporting system is in concept and design adequate to assure the
board that appropriate information will come to its attention in a timely manner as a matter of ordinary
operations.”).
51. Chancellor Allen painted the liability risk as relatively inconsequential, holding that “only a
sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight” such as “an utter failure to attempt to
assure that a reasonable information and reporting system exists” would lead to director liability.
Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970. See also Cindy Alexander et al., Regulating Corporate Criminal
Sanctions: Federal Guidelines and the Sentencing of Public Firms, 12 FED. SENT. REPT’R, No. 1, at 20
(1999); Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the
Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 819-20 (2001)
(arguing that boards of directors have overestimated the threat of personal liability under Caremark)
[hereinafter Langevoort].
52. Employment discrimination is governed by a variety of statutes, rules, and regulations. The
most important of these is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment
discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)
(1994 & Supp. 2003). In addition to Title VII’s prohibitions against workplace discrimination, the Age
Discrimination and Employment Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act prohibit employment
discrimination on the basis of age and disability, respectively. Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12,101-12,213 (Supp. V 1993). Other relevant anti-discrimination laws include the Family and
Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2000); several post-reconstruction civil rights laws, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1981(a), 1983, 1988; executive orders under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson; the
rules, regulations, and interpretations of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; and various
state statutes. See Elizabeth Chambliss & Lauren B. Edelman, Sociological Perspectives on Equal
Employment Law, in LAW’S DISCIPLINARY ENCOUNTERS: READINGS IN LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
(Victoria Saker Woeste, Bryant G. Garth, & Robert L. Nelson eds., forthcoming U. of Chicago Press,
2003).
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compliance-based liability system in deterring employment discrimination
than in other fields of law. As a result, the role of internal compliance
structures in the employment discrimination context is extremely important
because it provides insights for employers implementing other types of
compliance structures and for courts evaluating those structures. In addition,
if, as seems likely, the standard for enterprise liability in other legal areas
becomes more dependant on the presence of internal compliance structures,
these discrimination cases and academic commentary will assume greater
importance to other fields.
A firm’s internal compliance structures are relevant in the employment
discrimination context in at least three ways.53 First, internal compliance
structures may operate as a defense against punitive damages when an
employee claims that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination.
Second, internal compliance structures may serve as an affirmative defense
against enterprise liability when an employee alleges that she has been the
victim of hostile work environment harassment. Third, and less obviously,
the existence and efficacy of the employer’s internal compliance structures
may be examined—along with other circumstantial evidence—to determine
whether the employer harbored discriminatory intent.
1. Punitive Damages
In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress provided plaintiffs alleging
violations of Title VII with additional remedies, including the possibility of
punitive damages in cases successfully alleging intentional discrimination.54
In United States v. Kolstad, the Supreme Court referred to the Restatement
(Second) of Agency to establish four instances in which employers may be
liable for punitive damages for the acts of their agents:
53. Courts may also require employers found guilty of discrimination to implement codes of
conduct and training procedures as a remedy. See, e.g., Stair v. Lehigh Valley Carpenters Local Union
No. 600, 855 F. Supp. 90 (E.D.Pa. 1994) (requiring a union found guilty of sexual harassment to
institute mandatory yearly training programs for local members); Matt O’Connor, Pizza Hut to Fight
Bias in Chain, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 21, 1999, at C1 (reporting agreement by Pizza Hut to provide “racialsensitivity” training to each of its more than 100,000 employees who may come into contact with
customers as part of a legal settlement with African American customers alleging discrimination at one
Illinois restaurant).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (2000). In order to collect punitive damages, the complaining party
must show that the defendant “engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with
malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.” 42
U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (2000).
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(a) [T]he principal authorized the doing and the manner of the act, or
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal was reckless in employing
him, or (c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was
acting in the scope of employment, or (d) the principal or a managerial
agent of the principal ratified or approved the act.55
Arguing that the Restatement’s “scope of employment” rule created
“perverse incentives,” however, the Court established a defense to punitive
damages based on the actions of managerial agents under instance (c).
Employers who are able to demonstrate good faith efforts to comply with the
provisions of Title VII may thus avoid punitive damages stemming from the
actions of their agents acting within the scope of their employment.56
Since Kolstad, numerous defendants have attempted to qualify for this
defense by pointing to their internal compliance structures (and to their equal
employment policies and diversity education programs, in particular) as
evidence of good faith. Although in many cases courts have found that such
procedures are inadequate to demonstrate good faith convincingly, some
defendants have successfully used their internal compliance structures as a
shield from punitive damages.57 As a result, there has been an increasing
emphasis during discovery on the employer’s internal compliance structures,
with plaintiff’s lawyers and the EEOC seeking to determine how much
money the employer has spent on diversity training, the content of the
training sessions, and the expertise of the trainers.58
55. Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 542-43 (1999) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217(c)).
56. Id. at 545.
57. See, e.g., Harris v. L & L Wings, Inc., 132 F.3d 978, 983-84 (4th Cir. 1997) (cited favorably
in Kolstad and stating that “in some cases, the existence of a written policy instituted in good faith has
operated as a total bar to employer liability for punitive damages” and further stating that “the
institution of a written sexual harassment policy goes a long way towards dispelling any claim about
the employer’s ‘reckless’ or ‘malicious’ state of mind.”); Bryant v. Aiken Regional Medical Centers,
Inc., 333 F.3d 536 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that a hospital could not be liable to African-American
employees for punitive damages because the “hospital undertook wide-spread good-faith antidiscrimination efforts, including its implementation of an organization-wide antidiscrimination policy,
its creation of a grievance policy, and its diversity training program, and thus it could not be
vicariously liable for it managerial employees’ discriminatory decisions that were contrary to its good
faith efforts.”); EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 187 F.3d 1241, 1249 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating, “the
extent to which an employer has adopted antidiscrimination policies and educated its employees about
the requirements of the ADA is important in deciding whether it is insulated from vicarious punitive
liability.”); Jaudon v. Elder Health, Inc., 125 F. Supp.2d 153, 172 (D.Md. 2000) (finding that the
defendant employer had demonstrated a good faith effort to comply with Title VII because it had
“published, maintained, and distributed sexual harassment, open door, and equal opportunity
policies.”).
58. Ellen McLaughlin & Carol Merchasin, Training Becomes Important Step to Avoid Liability,
23 NAT. L.J., Jan. 29, 2001, at B10.
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2. Workplace Harassment
The United States Supreme Court has recognized two forms of workplace
harassment (tangible employment actions and hostile environment
harassment) as forms of discrimination, and thus viable claims under Title
VII.59 The Court could hardly be clearer in its insistence that employers will
be rewarded in harassment actions for the adoption of internal compliance
structures, stating that, “Title VII is designed to encourage the creation of
antiharassment policies and effective grievance mechanisms. Were employer
liability to depend in part on an employer’s effort to create such procedures,
it would effect Congress’ intention to promote conciliation rather than
litigation in the Title VII context.”60
Employers face liability for hostile environment harassment by their
employees under three different standards:61 (1) for co-worker hostile
environment harassment, the employer is judged under a negligence standard
and is liable for all harassment of which it knew (or should have known) and
negligently failed to correct; (2) for supervisor hostile environment
harassment of which the employer was aware, the employer is held to a
negligence standard and is liable only for its own negligence in failing to
properly respond to the harassment; and (3) for supervisor hostile
59. Tangible employment actions (or, “quid pro quo” harassment) involve “a significant change
in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly
different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits” made on the basis of
any of Title VII’s protected classes. “Hostile environment” harassment occurs when the employer’s
behavior is so severe or pervasive that, although there is no tangible harm, such as job loss or
decreased pay, the behavior nonetheless alters the terms or conditions of employment in violation of
Title VII. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761-62 (1998).
Because the employer faces strict vicarious liability for all tangible employment actions, the
employer’s internal procedures are not relevant in a tangible employment action, except perhaps to the
extent that they can be invoked to dispute the existence of the harassment or employed as a defense to
punitive damages. Burlington Industries, 524 U.S. at 762-63 (holding that “a tangible employment
action taken by the supervisor becomes for Title VII purposes the act of the employer. . . . In that
instance, it would be implausible to interpret agency principles to allow an employer to escape
liability.”). However, the employer’s internal procedures are likely to be relevant in one form or
another in all hostile environment claims.
60. Burlington Industries, 524 U.S. at 764.
61. B. Glenn George, If You’re Not Part of the Solution, You’re Part of the Problem: Employer
Liability for Sexual Harassment, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 133, 142 (2001) [hereinafter George].
Although the Supreme Court distinguished between (and adopted differing standards for) supervisor
hostile environment harassment of which the employer was aware and such harassment of which the
employer remained unaware, apparently a majority of circuits have failed to appreciate this distinction
and have applied the two-pronged affirmative defense to all supervisor hostile environment claims. Id.
at 143. According to Professor B. Glenn George, the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits have all erroneously applied the two-pronged defense for vicarious liability to cases in which
the employer was aware of the harassing conduct and thus should have been judged under a negligence
standard. Id. at 145.
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environment harassment of which the employer is unaware, the employer is
vicariously liable, unless it can establish a two part affirmative defense: (a)
“that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly
any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”62
In each of these hostile environment harassment claims, the employer’s
anti-harassment policies and internal complaint procedures will be relevant to
proving knowledge, negligence, or an affirmative defense. For example, an
anti-harassment policy, employee training designed to prevent harassment,
and formal harassment complaint procedures may all constitute evidence that
the employer was not negligent in failing to discover the harassment.63
Similarly, these same procedures may be used to show that, despite the
plaintiff’s complaints of harassment, knowledge cannot be imputed to the
employer.64
The cases in which the employer’s harassment policies and procedures
will be most directly relevant, however, are cases of supervisor hostile work
environment harassment unknown to the employer, in which the employer
may escape liability by utilizing its internal compliance structures to show
that it exercised reasonable care to prevent the harassment. In adopting the
two-pronged affirmative defense, the Supreme Court declined to require antiharassment policies and compliance structures as a matter of law and never
stated that such policies and structures, standing alone, are sufficient to
62. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998). See also Burlington Industries,
524 U.S. at 764 (1998) (adopting the same standard).
63. See, e.g., Newton v. Shell Oil Co., 52 F. Supp.2d 366, 372 (D.Conn. 1999) (stating that an
employer must provide some avenue for complaints in order to avoid liability for a negligent failure to
know of existing harassment); Velez v. City of Jersey City, 817 A.2d 409, 414 (N.J.Super.A.D. 2003)
(holding, “an employer may be held liable for sexual harassment under a theory of negligence based
upon ‘its failure to have in place well-publicized and enforced anti-harassment policies, effective
formal and informal complaint structures, training, and/or monitoring mechanisms.’”) (quoting
Lehman v. Toys R Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 621, 626 A.2d 445, 462 (1993). See also George, supra note
61, at 151 (stating that “[I]f knowledge is lacking, the court’s focus is limited under
Faragher/Burlington Industries to past efforts to prevent harassment, usually in the form of a wellpublicized anti-harassment policy.”).
64. For example, in Madray v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 208 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 926 (2000), the court held that, because the employer’s well-publicized antiharassment policy specified the proper channels for harassment complaints and the plaintiff did not
follow those channels, knowledge of the plaintiff’s harassment could not be imputed to the employer,
despite the plaintiff’s informal complaints to three different management-level employees. Id. at 1293.
See also Giuliani v. Stuart Corp., 512 N.W.2d 589 (Minn. App. 1994) (stating, “[w]hen companies
institute written policies established to deal intelligently with allegations of sexual harassment, it is
more likely that management will be informed of any impropriety occurring within the company.
Companies that fail to institute such policies will naturally find themselves vulnerable to the likelihood
that knowledge will be imputed to them.”); George, supra note 61, at 151-52 (discussing Madray).
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insulate employers from liability for supervisor hostile environment
harassment. The Court, however, did highlight the importance of antiharassment policies and internal complaint procedures in establishing the
first prong of the defense, stating that “[w]hile proof that an employer had
promulgated an anti-harassment policy with complaint procedure is not
necessary in every instance as a matter of law, the need for a stated policy
suitable to the employment circumstances may appropriately be addressed in
any case when litigating the first element of the defense.”65
Many lower courts, however, seem to have gone much further, and have
treated internal compliance structures designed to eliminate harassment as
both necessary and sufficient conditions for liability avoidance. For example,
some lower courts have treated anti-harassment policies and internal
complaint procedures as in and of themselves legally sufficient to establish
the reasonableness of the employer’s attempts to prevent or correct
harassment.66 As a result, some employers have been able to use internal
compliance procedures as a means to escape liability for proven instances of
even repeated and severe harassment. Similarly, many lower courts have
seemed to treat internal compliance structures as a necessary condition for
liability avoidance, ruling that defendants without such structures cannot
establish the affirmative defense.67
Although the true extent to which anti-harassment internal compliance
structures reduce employer liability is an empirical question that is only
partially answered here,68 as discussed in Part VI.B.1, legal compliance
65. Burlington Industries, 524 U.S. at 745. See also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
66. See, e.g., Smith v. First Union National Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 244 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating that
“[a]n employer’s adoption of an effective anti-harassment policy is an important factor in determining
whether it exercised reasonable care to prevent any sexually harassing behavior.”); Brown v. Perry,
184 F.3d 388, 396 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that if “there is no evidence that an employer adopted or
administered an anti-harassment policy in bad faith or that the policy was otherwise defective or
dysfunctional, the existence of such a policy militates strongly in favor of a conclusion that the
employer ‘exercised reasonable care to prevent’ and promptly correct sexual harassment.”); Idusuyi v.
State of Tennessee Dept. of Children’s Services, 2002 WL 220640, at *4 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that
the employer was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its affirmative defense because it had a
policy prohibiting sexual harassment, a complaint procedure that the plaintiff failed to use, and a twohour training session on sexual harassment); Citroner v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 208 F. Supp.2d 328,
341 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent racial harassment
because it had adopted an anti-harassment policy and a complaint procedure, “the Code of Conduct
and Open Door Policy.”).
67. See, e.g., Molnar v. Booth, 229 F.3d 593, 601 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding, as a matter of law,
that defendant employer “could never show that it had exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly any harassing behavior” because “it had no policy specifically aimed at sexual harassment,”
only a non-discrimination policy).
68. See infra notes 167-87 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of the defendant
employer’s grievance procedures on the avoidance of enterprise-level liability for workplace
harassment).
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professionals have cleverly, but predictably, repackaged these lower court
decisions into absolute necessities for organizations hoping to avoid huge
liabilities.69 The result is a proliferation of anti-harassment compliance
structures, with very little inquiry by courts, commentators, or the legal
profession into the evidence of their effectiveness as a means of harassment
prevention.
3. Discriminatory Intent
Increasingly, plaintiffs alleging intentional discrimination are unable to
point to direct evidence of overt animus.70 Whether through changed social
mores or increased sophistication regarding litigation, employers are unlikely
today to leave a smoking gun that plaintiffs can use to demonstrate
discrimination.71 As a result, victims of discrimination are likely to rely on
circumstantial evidence to prove their case.72
Most disparate treatment claims thus proceed under the three-part
framework established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas v.
Green,73 under which both the plaintiff and defendant may invoke the
employer’s internal compliance structures (or lack thereof) in seeking to
provide circumstantial evidence that the employer did or did not intentionally
69. See, e.g., Ellen McLaughlin & Carol Merchasin, Training Becomes Important Step To Avoid
Liability, NAT’L. L.J., JAN. 29, 2001, at B10 (stating, “engaging in quality training in conjunction with
a well-written policy will likely translate into successfully meeting the good-faith defense of
Kolstad.”); Gruner, supra note 20, at 163 (stating that “the liability standards in the EEO field . . .
make compliance program quality the key to reducing certain forms of employer liability.”). See also
infra Part VII (discussing the role of legal professionals in constructing vague EEO law).
70. As stated by one commentator, “the sign on the door that ‘Irish need not apply’ or the
rejection explained by the comment that ‘this is no job for a woman’—are largely things of the past.”
Sturm, supra note 9 at 459-60.
71. Rosen v. Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 528, 533 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that “an employer who
discriminates is unlikely to leave a ‘smoking gun,’ such as a notation in an employee’s personnel file,
attesting to a discriminatory intent.”).
72. Id. (stating that “[a] victim of discrimination is therefore seldom able to prove his or her
claim by direct evidence and is usually constrained to rely on the cumulative weight of circumstantial
evidence.”).
73. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under the McDonnell Douglas
framework, the plaintiff initially bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination
by demonstrating that she is a member of a protected class, that she was qualified for the job that is the
subject of the dispute, and that she suffered an adverse employment action under circumstances giving
rise to an inference of discrimination. Id. at 802. Once the plaintiff establishes this prima facie case,
the burden then shifts to the defendant to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the
adverse employment decision. St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993). If the
defendant provides evidence of a legitimate non-discriminatory purpose, then the burden shifts back to
the plaintiff to prove “by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the
defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.” Texas Dept. of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
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discriminate against the plaintiff based on her status as a member of a
protected class.74 Although whether the presence of such internal compliance
structures results in systematic differences in the likelihood and amount of
employer liability for intentional discrimination is an empirical question that
has not yet been answered, the important point for the purposes of this
Article, as discussed in Part VI.B, is that corporate management—at the
urging of a variety of legal compliance professionals—believes that such
structures are important to liability determinations.
IV. EVIDENCE OF EFFECTIVENESS
As discussed in the previous section, the U.S. legal system places a heavy
emphasis on internal compliance structures as a liability determinant in a
wide variety of legal contexts. Presumably, this emphasis stems from an
assumption that internal compliance structures are an effective means of
reducing the incidence of socially undesirable conduct within organizations.
This section will demonstrate, however, that this assumption—which
underlies an important and ever-growing segment of the legal regime relating
to organizational liability—has not withstood empirical testing.
In fact, little evidence exists at all concerning the effectiveness of internal
compliance structures as a means to reduce socially harmful conduct, a fact
that, in and of itself, is troubling given the legal system’s enthusiastic
embrace of such structures as a liability determinant. Even more disturbing,
perhaps, is the fact that the evidence that does exist is decidedly mixed, with
many of the most methodologically sound studies indicating the lack of
effectiveness of such structures.
This section analyzes the empirical evidence regarding three types of
internal compliance structures: (1) ethics or conduct codes; (2) the OSGrecommended internal compliance structures; and (3) diversity training. As
will be shown, there is insufficient empirical evidence to conclude that any of
these mechanisms—so enthusiastically embraced by the legal system—are
effective deterrence mechanisms.
74. Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex
Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1749, 1789-92 (1990) (discussing the use at trial of evidence of internal compliance structures,
especially affirmative action policies, to establish the lack of interest defense in sex discrimination
cases). Similarly, employers’ internal compliance structures may be relevant to decisions in disparate
impact cases. Sturm, supra note 9, at 488-89.
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A. Ethics Codes
Ethics codes are one of the most common internal compliance structures
employed by business organizations, with over 90% of Fortune 500
corporations reporting that they have some sort of ethics code.75 In addition,
legal compliance professionals seem to agree on the importance of
establishing ethics codes that communicate the firm’s commitment to lawful
activity.76
Despite the pervasiveness of ethics codes in corporate America and the
insistence by many legal compliance professionals on their importance as a
deterrence tool, little evidence exists to support the theory that ethics codes
modify employee behavior. Although some studies do find a significant
relationship between ethics codes and employee conduct, they are often
plagued by methodological problems, such as a failure to query respondents
on or identify modified behavior due to the codes (as opposed to simply
asking survey respondents whether they believe ethics codes are important
factors affecting behavior), a reliance on hypothetical dilemmas in lab
settings (as opposed to analyzing actual conduct in an employment setting),
and a sole reliance on self-reporting (as opposed to documenting observable
instances of employee code infractions).77 Furthermore, these findings are
contradicted by a large number of studies that find no significant relationship
between ethics codes and employee conduct.78
75. Brien, supra note 20, at 21. In addition, in a recent survey of 254 large firms, 78% responded
that they had an ethics code. G. Weaver, L. Trevino, & P. Cochran, Corporate Ethics Practices in the
Mid-1990s: An Empirical Study of the Fortune 1000, 18 J. BUS. ETHICS 283 (1999).
76. McKendall et al., supra note 16, at 372.
77. See, e.g., Alan Kitson, Taking the Pulse: Ethics and the British Cooperative Bank, 15(9) J.
BUS. ETHICS 1021 (1996) (interviews with 17 bank managers); Donald L. McCabe et al., The
Influence of Collegiate and Corporate Codes of Conduct on Ethics-Related Behavior in the
Workplace, 6(4) BUS. ETHICS Q. 461 (1996) (questionnaire to 328 college graduates); Margaret Anne
Pierce & John W. Henry, Computer Ethics: The Role of Personal, Informal, and Formal Codes, 15(4)
J. BUS. ETHICS 425 (1996) (questionnaire responses from 356 data processing management
professionals).
78. See, e.g., Jeff Allen & Duane Davis, Assessing Some Determinant Effects of Ethical
Consulting Behavior: The Case of Personal and Professional Values, 12(6) J. BUS. ETHICS 449 (1993)
(questionnaire survey of 207 national business consultants); Joseph L. Badaracco, Jr. & Allen P.
Webb, Business Ethics: A View of From the Trenches, 37(2) CA. MGMT. R. 8 (1995) (interviews with
30 middle managers); Arthur P. Brief et al., What’s Wrong with the Treadway Commission Report?
Experimental Analyses of the Effects of Personal Values and Codes of Conduct on Fraudulent
Financial Reporting, 15(2) J. BUS. ETHICS 183 (1996) (questionnaires and experiment with nearly 400
executives and controllers); Victor J. Callan, Predicting Ethical Values and Training Needs in Ethics,
11(10) J. BUS. ETHICS 761 (1992) (questionnaires from 226 state government employees); Margaret
Anne Clark & Sherry Lynn Leonard, Can Corporate Codes of Ethics Influence Behavior?, 17(6) J.
BUS. ETHICS 619 (1998) (questionnaires from 150 graduate and undergraduate business students).
However, many of these studies suffer from the same methodological problems that beset those studies
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One of the most recent and comprehensive of these studies attempts to
address some of the methodological flaws associated with prior studies, by
seeking to document a correlation between ethics codes and behavioral
modification by employees in a corporate setting.79 The study consisted of indepth interviews with fifty-seven employees at four large Canadian
companies.80 The study author concluded that, although ethics codes may
have the potential to alter employee behavior, “this appears to take place on
very rare occasions.”81 The author found that respondents were unable to
provide specific instances of behavior modification due to ethics codes and,
in fact, overwhelmingly indicated that their employers’ ethics codes had not
altered their behavior.82 In addition, some respondents indicated that they had
never referred to their employers’ corporate code.83
These findings, while not dispositive, call into question the legal regime’s
mitigation of damages based on the presence of ethics and conduct codes. Of
course, ethics codes are only one type of compliance structure, and a
superficial one at that. Perhaps researchers have been unable to document a
link between ethics codes and ethical conduct because supporting
compliance structures, such as those required by the OSGs, are necessary to
deter misconduct. As discussed in the following subsection, however, this
hypothesis also has not withstood empirical testing.
B. The OSGs
As previously discussed, due to advice from legal compliance
professionals, organizational compliance structures tend to mirror the
recommendations of the OSGs. There has been very little research, however,
that seeks to determine whether these structures deter illegal conduct.
Instead, most research on internal compliance structures has focused on the
percentage of companies using various structures, analysis of the substantive
content of ethics and conduct codes, employee surveys of their perceptions of
their company’s conduct codes, and self-reporting of conduct code
finding a significant relationship between ethics codes and employee conduct.
79. Mark S. Schwartz, The Nature of the Relationship Between Corporate Codes of Ethics and
Behavior, 32 J. BUS. ETHICS 247 (2001) [hereinafter Schwartz]. Like previous studies, however,
Schwartz relied on self-reporting, rather than observed conduct modifications.
80. Id. at 247. The subjects had spent an average of 13.4 years at their respective companies. All
participants were interviewed individually. Fifty-one of the fifty-seven interviews were taped and
transcribed. The average interview length was sixty-five minutes. Id. at 252.
81. Id. at 253
82. Id.
83. Id.
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violations.84 In fact, I was able to identify only three large-scale studies that
seek systematically to test the assumptions of the OSG recommendations.85
None of the studies supported the hypothesis that the internal compliance
structures recommended by the OSGs have a deterrent effect on
organizational illegality. The most recent of these studies, a longitudinal
comparison of the presence of OSG-recommended compliance structures and
the incidence of OSHA violations, by Marie McKendall, Beverly DeMarr,
and Catherine Jones-Rikkers, studied internal compliance structures that
nearly mirror the OSG recommendations and found that they had no impact
on corporate illegality.86
Indeed, the authors found empirical support for the proposition that
internal compliance structures such as those recommended by the OSGs are
largely window-dressing.87 The study’s one robust finding—a positive
correlation between internal compliance structures recommended by the
OSGs and the incidence of willful and repeat OSHA violations—led the
study authors to speculate that, because willful and repeat violations are the
type most likely to entail management involvement or knowledge,
organizations may be using the type of internal compliance structures
84. McKendall et al., supra note 16, at 373.
85. The three studies are: M. Cash Mathews, Codes of Ethics: Organizational Behavior and
Misbehavior, in RESEARCH IN CORPORATE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE 107, 125 (W. Frederick ed., 1987)
(examining the incidence of administrative and civil actions taken by four federal regulatory agencies
against 485 corporations from 1973 through 1980 and concluding that “there is little relationship
between codes of conduct [and enforcement mechanisms] and corporate violations.”) [hereinafter
Mathews]; Marie McKendall & John A. Wegner, III, Motive, Opportunity, Choice, and Corporate
Illegality, 8(16) ORG. SCI. 624 (1997); McKendall et al., supra note 16.
86. McKendall and her co-authors included independent variables for all aspects of the OSG
recommendations for an effective compliance program except one: the appointment of a specific
individual with responsibility for the compliance program. McKendall et al., supra note 16, at 376-79.
87. Id. at 380. Similarly, M. Cash Mathews found an unanticipated positive correlation between
certain aspects of conduct code content (such as codes that require compliance affidavits by employees
or that mention “maintaining the reputation of the corporation”) and the number of violations. Among
several potential explanations for this finding offered by Cash is that “perhaps executives at lawabiding corporations do not feel the need to convince others of their ‘good reputation.’” Mathews,
supra note 85, at 125. See also Richard A. Barker, An Evaluation of the Ethics Program at General
Dynamics, 12 J. BUS. ETHICS 165, 175-77 (1993) (finding that the ethics program at General
Dynamics is intended primarily to differentiate the firm from its competitors, rather than to deter
misconduct); Dove Izraeli & Mark Schwartz, What Can We Learn From the U.S. Federal Sentencing
Guidelines for Organizational Ethics?, 17 J. BUS. ETHICS 1045 (1998) (stating that the primary
purpose of internal compliance structures is to mitigate damages rather than to deter misconduct);
McKendall et al., supra note 16, at 379 (stating that, “a growing number of researchers have charged
that the purpose of corporate ethical practices is not foremost and genuinely to promote ethical
behavior”); Gary R. Weaver et al., Corporate Ethics Practices in the Mid-1990’s: An Empirical Study
of the Fortune 1000, 18(3) J. BUS. ETHICS 283, 283 (1999) (finding that “the vast majority of firms
have committed to the lower cost, possibly more symbolic side of ethics activity”) [hereinafter Weaver
et al.].

p487 Krawiec book pages.doc10/27/03 11:42 AM

514

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

[VOL. 81:487

recommended by the OSGs as a mechanism to hide management
involvement in or reduce enterprise liability for purposeful illegal activity.88
C. Diversity Training
Diversity training is becoming an increasingly common type of internal
compliance structure in American businesses. A 1998 study by the Society
for Human Resource Management, for example, found that seventy-five
percent of firms in the Fortune 500 and thirty-six percent of other firms have
a diversity training program of some sort.89 Nonetheless, systematic study of
the impact of these programs has generally not been undertaken.90 Most
diversity training programs are never subjected to orderly evaluation. Even
when they are, such evaluation normally consists of qualitative feedback
from participants.91 Few attempts have been made to evaluate the impact of
diversity training on employee behavior.
In a recent working paper, Katerina Bezrukova and Karen Jehn of the
Wharton School reviewed twenty empirical studies published in major
management, psychological, and sociological journals, and concluded that,
“[h]aving reviewed the available empirical studies on the effects of diversity
training programs in corporations and on campuses it is obvious that it is too
soon to draw any comprehensive conclusions.”92
Specifically, Bezrukova and Jehn found that researchers have investigated
the impact of diversity training on three dependent variables: awareness of
diversity issues; behavior and attitude change; and response to the diversity
program.93 Much of the empirical research revealed improvements in
participants’ awareness of diversity issues due to diversity training.94
88. Weaver et al., supra note 79, at 380.
89. Richard S. Allen & Kendyl A. Montgomery, Applying an Organizational Development
Approach to Creating Diversity, 30(2) ORG. DYNAMICS 149, 149 (2002).
90. Loriann Roberson et al., Designing Effective Diversity Training: Influence of Group
Composition and Trainee Experience, 22 J. ORG. BEHAVIOR 871, 871 (2001) [hereinafter Roberson et
al.]; Katerina Bezrukova & Karen A. Jehn, The Effects of Diversity Training Programs (July 2001)
(working paper at 9, on file with author) [hereinafter Bezrukova & Jehn].
91. Roberson et al., supra note 90, at 872.
92. Bezrukova & Jehn, supra note 90, at 16.
93. Id. at 9.
94. See Bezrukova & Jehn, supra note 90, at 10-11. See also Heidi Tarr Henson, Gauging the
Outcomes of Organizational Diversity Implementations: The Intersection of Attitudes, Awareness, and
Behavior, 60(7-A) DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INT’L 2,325 (2000) (finding that diversity training
achieved an awareness of diversity issues, but did not result in attitudinal changes) [hereinafter
Henson]; Dick Wallace Kracht, Diversity Training Among Manufacturing Companies: Reaction and
Learning in a For-Profit and Not-for-Profit Work Environment, 59(7-A) DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS
INT’L 2,345 (1999) (finding an increase in perceived learning among 141 employees after diversity
training); J. Mausehund et al., Diversity Training: Effects of an Intervention Treatment on Nonverbal
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However, the studies provided little empirical support for the proposition that
diversity training contributes to attitudinal or behavioral changes.95
Finally, anecdotal evidence as well as some formal studies document a
backlash against diversity training that undermines the goal of increasing
tolerance toward racial, gender, and cultural diversity.96 At the same time,
some other studies document generally positive reactions to diversity training
by program participants.97
Awareness, 58(1) BUSINESS COMMUNICATION Q. 27 (1995) (finding a positive link between diversity
training and awareness of nonverbal factors in interpersonal communications between people from
different cultures); Dana Yavette Law, An Evaluation of a Cultural Diversity Training Program, 59
(5-B) DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INT’L 2,468 (1998) (finding improved awareness of diversity issues
in training group relative to control group); David L. Tan et al., Changes in Attitude After Diversity
Training, 50(9) TRAINING & DEVELOPMENT 54 (1996) (finding a significant increase in diversity
awareness in 739 managers after diversity training workshops).
95. Compare Taylor Cox, Jr., The Multicultural Organization, 5(2) ACADEMY OF MGMT R. 34
(1991) (finding that “Race Relations Competence Workshops” resulted in more positive attitudes
toward African-Americans and better inter-race relations among workshop participants) with Sara
Rynes & Benson Rosen, What Makes Diversity Programs Work? 39(10) H.R. MAGAZINE 67 (1994)
(surveying 785 members of the Society for Human Resource Management and finding positive short
term impact of diversity training on attitudes, but less positive long-term benefits); Diane Marie
Govern, The Effect of Diversity Awareness Training on Oral Presentation Ratings, 58(10-B)
DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INT’L 5,681 (1998) (finding no correlation between diversity training and
ratings of oral presentations by black and white police sergeant candidates); Henson, supra note 94
(finding no attitudinal change in respondents from diversity training). Bezrukova and Jehn, supra note
90, also reviewed five studies that tested the impact of diversity training programs on college
campuses. Although four studies found a small positive correlation between diversity training and
attitudes toward ethnic minorities, the authors attributed this variation to self-selection bias, rather than
to a real change in attitudes. The other study found no correlation between diversity training and racial
attitudes. Id. at 12-13.
96. See, e.g., HEMPHILL & HAINES, supra note 15. Hemphill and Haines questioned over 500
executives, managers, and directors, and over 100 diversity consultants at sixty-five companies. Id. at
1 & 5. They document a considerable backlash against diversity training and a belief by many senior
managers that such training fails to reduce harassment and discrimination. An example of comments
that they describe as typical is, “every white man in my workforce went ballistic over the diversity
training program I brought in last month.” Id. at 1. See also Michael Mobley & Tamara Payne,
Backlash: The Challenge of Diversity Training, 46(12) TRAINING AND DEVEL. 46 (1992) (stating that
“in our own diversity training work we have found backlash subtly sabotaging efforts to provide teamoriented, flexible organizations.”); Stephen Paskoff, Ending the Workplace Diversity Wars, TRAINING,
Aug. 1996, at 43 (stating that “[m]any of today’s programs are a waste of valuable time” and further
asserting that “thousands of managers have similar attitudes”).
97. See Bezrukova & Jehn, supra note 90, at 13-14 (discussing the available studies). Further
compromising the effectiveness of diversity training is the fact that frank discussions of stereotypes
and prejudices during diversity training can lead to angry disagreements and, in some cases, lawsuits.
Some of the statements made by managers and employees during these sessions have been admitted as
evidence of discriminatory intent in EEO cases. See, e.g., Stender v. Lucky Stores Inc., 803 F. Supp.
259, 292-93 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (admitting into evidence management statements regarding gender
stereotypes made in response to a request by a consultant for an example of a stereotype during a
meeting on the company’s non-discriminatory promotion and hiring practices); HEMPHILL & HAINES,
supra note 15, at 1 (quoting a business executive as stating that a diversity training session in which
participants were encouraged to discuss stereotypes produced angry employees and evidence in several
discrimination lawsuits). As a result, legal compliance professionals now encourage a more
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V. INTERNAL COMPLIANCE AS NEGOTIATED GOVERNANCE
Given the lack of empirical support for internal compliance structures as
effective deterrence mechanisms, the question must be answered: what
explains their enthusiastic embrace by the legal system? In other words, a
close analysis of the growth of internal compliance structures as a liability
determinant has far-reaching implications beyond the criticism of existing
legal policy—it also provides an illustrative case study of the mechanisms by
which flawed legal policy develops.
This Part V argues that the United States legal regime’s current focus on
internal compliance structures as a liability determinant is part of a larger
trend toward “negotiated governance” that seeks to improve regulation by
providing a greater governance role to the regulated group and other
interested parties. Although these negotiated governance models vary in their
particulars, they share two common themes. First, all assert that regulation
should be more co-operative and collaborative, and less authoritative.
Second, each rests on an assumption that greater involvement in the
governance process by a variety of interested groups—including the
regulated group—will produce a more effective regulatory regime.
This Article accepts much of the negotiated governance models’
descriptive claims regarding the mechanisms by which legal policy is often
made in the United States. As noted by Professor Jody Freeman, both critics
and advocates of negotiated governance, focused on normative arguments
regarding the desirability of private actors in the governance process, often
ignore the extent to which modern regulation already resembles the
negotiated governance model.98
This Article, however, rejects the negotiated governance models’ benign
view of the impact of private actors on the governance process. As discussed
in this Part V, the various negotiated governance models largely fail to
address an important point: to the extent that governance is properly analyzed
as a set of negotiated relationships or related contracts,99 the inability (and,
“sterilized” version of diversity training, in which management is discouraged from openly expressing
any views that might be usable in litigation and all training materials are prepared with an eye toward
litigation. See, e.g., Ellen McLaughlin & Carol Merchasin, Training Becomes Important Step to Avoid
Liability, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 29, 2001, at B10 (advising management to create “jury worthy” training
sessions, refrain from discussing prejudices or stereotypes, and to draft all training materials “with an
eye toward possible discovery in litigation.”).
98. Freeman, Private Role, supra note 9, at 547 (noting that the “longstanding tradition of private
participation in governance” in the United States has been “barely noticed by the public,
acknowledged by politicians, or scrutinized by scholars”) and at 555 (arguing that “administrative law
scholarship mostly ignores the private role in administration.”).
99. Like Jody Freeman, who also explicitly adopts the contractual metaphor in analyzing the
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sometimes, unwillingness) of policymakers to perfectly specify all contract
terms means that these contracts or relationships are highly incomplete.100 As
a result, the regulated group (with the assistance of legal compliance
professionals) is left to fill in these contractual gaps, through the formal or
informal development of standard norms and practices. Accordingly,
much—though not all—of the internal compliance-based liability regime
results from court or regulatory agency approved industry responses to vague
or incomplete law, a phenomenon referred to here as an “Incomplete
Contracts Governance Theory.”
This is not to imply that advocates of negotiated governance fail to
appreciate the connection between incomplete law and negotiated
governance. To the contrary, some of the model’s most prominent advocates
explicitly note that much negotiated governance results from legal
incompleteness.101 Far from seeing this as a potentially dangerous
opportunity for strategic renegotiation as implied by the incomplete contracts
literature, however, advocates of negotiated governance applaud legal
incompleteness as a mechanism that encourages more creative solutions to
governance problems.102
governance relationship, I adopt the contractual analogy without implying that formal contracts exist
or that contractual terms are explicitly negotiated or renegotiated. Id. at 571. Instead, “the point is
simply that every aspect of policymaking, implementation, and enforcement depends on the combined
efforts of public and private actors.” Id.
100. One notable exception is J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, REGULATORY TAKINGS
AND THE DEREGULATORY CONTRACT (1998). Professors Sidak and Spulber refer to state public utility
regulation as a “contract between the state and the regulated company,” and acknowledge that this
contract is highly incomplete. Id. at 101, 104-05. However, Professors Sidak and Spulber focus solely
on the possibility of opportunistic behavior by the government regulator during the renegotiation
process, and do not address the possibility of opportunistic behavior by the regulated group or other
interested parties. Id. at 105-08. I do not mean to imply in this Article that policymakers never behave
opportunistically during the renegotiation of incomplete regulatory contracts. Instead, my thesis is that
the regulated group and others with an interest in filling out the incomplete contract terms, such as
legal compliance professionals, will often behave opportunistically as well.
101. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 9, at 886 (stating that “[w]hen experimentalist courts must resolve
the most contentious questions the legal system poses, they give deliberately incomplete answers.
Thus, in prospect at least, experimentalist appellate courts that declare rights based on irreducibly
ambiguous authority deliberately include ambiguity in their own pronouncements by establishing
frameworks for resolution rather than anything like comprehensive blueprints.”); Sturm, supra note 9,
at 475 (arguing that “second generation problems cannot be reduced to a fixed code of specific rules or
commands that establishes clear boundaries governing conduct.”).
102. See Dorf, supra note 9, at 960 (arguing that problem-solving courts can operate as a solution
to the problem of legal indeterminacy, because they create open-ended solutions that provide room for
the affected parties to create workable solutions); Sturm, supra note 9, at 475 (arguing that “[r]ules
developed externally and imposed unilaterally, whether by courts or regulatory bodies, cannot
adequately govern the range of circumstances implicated by the general principal of nondiscrimination” and arguing that the resolution of such problems requires problem solving, rather than
clear and specific rules governing conduct).
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For example, Professor Michael C. Dorf recently has argued that, rather
than seeking theories to justify judicial interpretation of ambiguous texts,
scholars and judges should seek to minimize the sphere of legal ambiguity
through collaboration with other institutions, groups, and actors to reach
workable solutions.103 Dorf advocates the Supreme Court’s approach in
sexual harassment cases, which he argues “places courts in the role of
monitoring employers’ monitoring of the their workplaces,” and the OSG
approach to corporate misconduct as examples of the type of
“experimentalist” or “problem-solving” approach that courts and agencies
should adopt when faced with statutory ambiguity.104
Professor Dorf’s proposal is closely related to recent fieldwork by
Professor Susan Sturm, who compiles case studies of three employers
experimenting, for a variety of reasons, with programs designed to reduce
discrimination and harassment in the workplace and to retain or promote
employees from underrepresented demographic groups.105 Sturm concludes
that, because successful strategies to combat “second generation”
employment discrimination must be customized to fit the needs of each
individual work setting, successful solutions must be internally generated.
Externally-mandated solutions, by contrast, will not be “sufficiently sensitive
to context or integrated into the day-to-day practice that shapes their
implementation” to truly alter workplace customs and habit. As a result, laws
governing such behavior should be flexible and open-ended, rather than
specific and authoritative.106
Other proponents of negotiated governance embrace the model (and,
sometimes, the contractual metaphor) without explicitly broaching the topic
of legal incompleteness. For example, Professors Ian Ayres and John
Braithwaite rely on civic republican theory107 to advocate a system of
103. Dorf, supra note 9, at 960.
104. Id. at 962-63 (discussing the Supreme Court’s sexual harassment rulings) and at n.305
(discussing the OSGs).
105. The three employers are: Deloitte & Touche, Intel Corporation, and Home Depot. Sturm,
supra note 9, at 492-520.
106. Id. at 475. To Sturm’s credit, she does recognize the danger that “lower courts and lawyers
may undercut the promise of [the problem-solving approach] by rubber stamping ineffective internal
processes.” Id. at 484. My criticism is merely that her optimism about the Supreme Court’s approach
to EEO law may be unwarranted, given the extent to which this has already occurred. My goal is thus
not to question the results of Sturm’s study, but their generalizability.
107. Civic republicanism contemplates that the parties to the lawmaking process—regulators and
interest groups alike—do not act solely in their selfish best interests, but instead share a sense of
“public spiritedness” that results in some collaborative decision regarding the best regulation to further
the mutually shared goals identified during the regulatory process. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE
RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 12 (1990); Steven P. Croley, Theories
of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 76-78 (1998)
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enforced self-regulation that “subcontracts” out to regulated firms much of
the responsibility for their own regulation.108 According to Ayres and
Braithwaite:
[E]nforced self-regulation envisions that in particular contexts it will
be more efficacious for the regulated firms to take on some or all of
the legislative, executive, and judicial regulatory functions. As selfregulating legislators, firms would devise their own regulatory rules;
as self-regulating executives, firms would monitor themselves for
noncompliance; and as self-regulating judges, firms would punish and
correct episodes of noncompliance.109
Of all the negotiated governance advocates, however, it is perhaps
Professor Jody Freeman who employs the contractual metaphor most
explicitly, drawing on both critical theory and public choice theory110 to
[hereinafter Croley] (characterizing the modern regulatory process as “a kind of post-New Deal
republicanism” that adheres to “the original belief in the governmental process as one of deliberation
oriented toward the public good rather than as a series of interest group trade-offs.”); Mark Seidenfeld,
A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1514 (1992)
(stating that “government’s primary responsibility is to enable the citizenry to deliberate about altering
preferences and to reach consensus on the common good.”). Under civic republicanism, neither
regulators nor interest groups come to the process with preconceived commitments to a particular
regulatory outcome. Instead, each participant forms a preference during the collaborative process itself
that incorporates the views and concerns of all other participants in the deliberation. Croley, supra, at
78. See also AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 9, at 93 (stating that the goal of regulatory partism is
“to modify the deliberative habits and behavioral dispositions of actors, not just to tinker with payoffs
of actors whose psychology is untouched.”). As a result, regulation represents the group’s consensus
about what regulation will best serve all the represented goals of the group.
Civic republican theory is in many instances a normative theory about what regulation should look
like in an ideal world. See, e.g., AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 9 (advocating institutional
reforms designed to encourage civic republican governance); Croley, supra note 107, at 81 (describing
civic republican theory as primarily normative). Even the strictly aspirational civic republican account
has been criticized, however, for failing to provide a theory that accounts for the emergence of publicspirited deliberators or that explains the means of avoiding decision-making impasse. Finally, civic
republicans’ attempts at descriptive claims have been criticized for a lack of empirical evidence
confirming the theory. Id. at 81-85.
108. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 9, at 101-32 (discussing enforced self-regulation).
Professor Ayres and Braithwaite also propose a system of “regulatory tripartism” that encourages
participation by “public interest groups” in the regulatory process, and a system of partial industry
regulation under which only a firm or subset of firms within an industry is regulated. Id. at 54-100
(discussing regulatory tripartism) and at 133-57 (discussing partial industry regulation).
109. Id. at 103. Ayres and Braithwaite emphasize that the extent to which these regulatory
functions are subcontracted out to the regulated firm should depend on the industry structure and
regulatory history of the firm in question. Id.
110. Public Choice theory can be broadly divided into two branches: voting theory, based on the
work of Kenneth Arrow, and interest group theory, based on the wok of George Stigler. See JERRY L.
MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, & GOVERNANCE 10 (1997) [hereinafter Mashaw]. Voting theory, based on
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, asserts that determinations based on majority rule may produce
indeterminate, random, or shifting outcomes—a process known as “cycling.” See generally Kenneth J.
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develop a model that views governance as a set of negotiated relationships
among a variety of public and private actors.111 Although Freeman draws on
public choice theory to develop the contractual governance model, her theory
differs from public choice in its account of the impact of private actors on the
regulatory process. Whereas public choice theory is deeply suspicious of the
role of private actors in the governance system, Freeman emphasizes the
benefits provided by the participation of private actors in the governance
process.112
The foregoing discussion of negotiated governance scholarship is
necessarily partial, at best. Indeed, prominent scholars and practitioners in
nearly every field seem to have joined the negotiated governance crusade,
either criticizing existing United States legal structures as overly formal and
legalistic and urging a more negotiated approach, or applauding new U.S.
legal developments as embracing the negotiated governance ideal.113
Arrow, A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare, 58 (4) J. POL. ECON. 328 (1950). Interest Group
Theory, on the other hand, views legal rules as the product of political bargains between special
interest groups and lawmakers. See generally George J. Stigler, The Economic Theory of Regulation, 2
BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).
111. See Freeman, Private Role, supra note 9. Freeman’s model is also consistent with modern
corporate law theory. For example, corporate law scholars have long employed the “nexus of
contracts” metaphor to describe the corporate enterprise. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William
H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J.
FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). Furthermore, consistent with Freeman’s decentralized approach to governance,
some recent corporate law scholarship has challenged the conception of some identifiable nexus within
the corporate enterprise and instead proposes that the corporate relationship is best viewed as a set of
“connected contracts.” See G. Mitu Gulati, et al., Connected Contracts, 47 UCLA L. REV. 887 (2000).
But see Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as a Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1
(2002) (challenging the connected contracts model).
112. Freeman, Private Role, supra note 9, at 548-49 (arguing that although the traditional view of
private actors in the governance process is one of “menacing outsiders whose influence threatens to
derail legitimate ‘public’ pursuits . . . private actors are also regulatory resources capable of
contributing to the efficacy and legitimacy of administration.”). Freeman envisions governance as a
collaborative endeavor among the regulator, the regulated group, and interested private parties. In
contrast to many other governance theories, however, she rejects the notion of governance as a
“hierarchical, agency-centered conception.” Id. at 547. Instead, she envisions a decentralized, dynamic
environment of policy-making, implementation and enforcement in which information and influence
may flow “downward, from agency to private actors; upward, from private actor to agency; and
horizontally among public and private actors.” Id. at 571. Importantly, Freeman also emphasizes that
negotiation over policy, enforcement, and implementation is a continuous process such that there is no
specific moment in time that can be identified as the seminal moment at which policy was made or
enforced. Id. at 572.
113. See generally ARCHON FUNG & ERIK OLIN WRIGHT, DEEPENING DEMOCRACY:
INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE (2003) (advocating a
form of “Empowered Participatory Governance,” in which significant authority is given to local
deliberative bodies and interested parties collaborate to reach workable solutions); ROBERT A. KAGAN,
ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM (2001) (criticizing American “adversarial legalism” and urging more
flexible regulatory approaches that promote participation by public and private interests, including the
regulated industry); Michael D. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
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As will be demonstrated in the following Part VI of this Article, these
negotiated governance models provide important descriptive insights into the
mechanisms by which internal compliance-based liability defenses gained
legitimacy within many parts of the legal regime and within Title VII, in
particular. A careful study of the internal compliance-based legal regime
demonstrates that compliance-based liability defenses have to a large extent
been developed by compliance professionals and business organizations in
collaboration with policymakers, as implied by the negotiated governance
model.
Simply accepting that negotiated governance models accurately describe
some governance mechanisms, however, does not mean that one must also
accept the benign view of private influence on the governance process
envisioned by those models’ proponents. Indeed, the empirical data presented
in Part IV of this Article throws doubt on negotiated governance theories that
emphasize only the benefits conferred by the involvement of private actors in
the governance process.
As I elaborate further in the following Part VI of this Article, to the extent
that governance is properly analyzed as a set of related contracts or
negotiated relationships, such contracts and relationships—like law itself—
are highly incomplete. Because the negotiated governance models largely fail
to address this fact, they minimize the dangers of opportunistic behavior by
private parties during renegotiation—that is, during the implementation and
enforcement phases of governance. Accordingly, as demonstrated in Part VI,
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998) (proposing “democratic experimentalism” as a form
of self government in which regulatory standards are based on best practice standards provided by
regulated industries themselves in exchange for the freedom to experiment with various regulatory
solutions); Robert A. Kagan, The Consequences of Adversarial Legalism, in REGULATORY
ENCOUNTERS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM 372-413
(Robert A. Kagan & Lee Axelrad eds., 2000) (criticizing American “adversarial legalism” and urging
more flexible regulatory approaches that promote participation by public and private interests,
including the regulated industry); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance:
Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189 (2002) (discussing “collaborative
ecosystem governance,” which depends on public-private collaboration and information sharing);
Barbara J. Zabawa, Making the Health Insurance Flexibility and Accountability (HIFA) Waiver Work
Through Collaborative Governance, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 367 (2003) (applauding the new HIFA
waiver as a vehicle to implement collaborative governance, because it encourages public-private
cooperation in the provision of health insurance). But see Dana, supra note 9, at 38-39 (arguing that
contractarian approaches to environmental regulation, under which the regulator and regulated entity
negotiate over policy, may not improve environmental quality because of the increased costs of
participation by environmental groups); William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium:
Regulatory Negotiation and the Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L.J. 1351, 1356 (1997)
(arguing that negotiated rulemaking undermines the public interest); Stewart, supra note 9, at 437,
448-54 (stating that although the agency-stakeholder networks model is a quasi-contractual working
relationship among various governmental and nongovernmental actors designed to promote flexible
problem solving, the model has numerous problems in theory and in practice).
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large segments of the internal compliance-based legal regime can be
attributed to the gap filling of incomplete law with terms favorable to those
parties most influential in this gap-filling process: organizational defendants
and legal compliance professionals.114
VI. INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS AND SELF-INTERESTED ACTORS
This Part expands through specific examples and empirical data the
argument developed in Part V that the negotiated governance model, by
analyzing the governance process as a set of negotiated relationships or
related contracts, provides important descriptive insights into the process by
which legal policy takes shape. Specifically this section argues that, as
predicted by the negotiated governance model, the governance process can
be usefully analyzed as a multi-stage reciprocal interaction among
policymakers, the regulated group, and important private actors, namely the
legal compliance professionals—lawyers, ethics and compliance consultants,
and internal compliance and human resources personnel—that serve as the
first-line interpreters of legal policy.
At the same time, however, this section demonstrates that proponents of
the negotiated governance model, while embracing the contractual metaphor
(and, sometimes, the incompleteness inherent in that metaphor)
underestimate the opportunities for strategic behavior during the
renegotiation of those metaphorical contracts. This contractual
incompleteness (and corresponding opening for opportunistic behavior)
inherent in the negotiated governance model implies two important points.
First, the regulated group, in its efforts to comply with new legal commands,
is left to fill in these contractual gaps through the formal or informal
development of standard norms and practices. Second, regulated groups
typically do not fill in these gaps on their own, but instead rely on the advice
of legal compliance professionals in interpreting vague or incomplete law. In
doing so, far from operating as the unbiased advocates of their clients’
interests, as assumed by some negotiated governance advocates,115 these
114. Although the Incomplete Contracts Governance Theory developed in this Article asserts that
much of the compliance-based liability regime—and organizational defenses under Title VII, in
particular—can be attributed to court or agency approved industry responses to vague or incomplete
law, it does not suggest that judges and agency bureaucrats approve such measures in order to enhance
their own power by currying favor with special interest groups. Instead, a careful analysis of the
process by which internal compliance structures gained legitimacy within much of the legal regime
suggests that it arises from the structural limitations (including limited time, budgets, and expertise)
facing courts and regulators in the process of filling gaps in incomplete law, regardless of the
motivations of judges and regulators.
115. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 9, at 875 (discussing the role of defense attorneys in problem-
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legal compliance professionals often interpret contractual terms and gaps in a
manner that enhances their own influence and importance to the regulated
group—constrained, of course, by the regulated group’s self interest in an
interpretation that enhances its own welfare. As a result, large segments of
the internal compliance-based legal regime can be attributed to the gap filling
of incomplete law with terms favorable to those parties most influential in
this gap filling process: organizational defendants and legal compliance
professionals.
Although the policymaker retains the authority to reject these gap-filling
interpretations as inconsistent with the initial contract terms, the policymaker
often lacks the expertise to differentiate ex post a self-serving or inefficient
interpretation from one that serves the public interest. As a result, even if one
rejects public choice theory’s notion of private interest capture of the
governance process, its assertion that the self-interested behavior of private
actors with a stake in policymaking will often manage to influence policy
and implementation in a negative way, appropriating more than their fair
share of the social benefits of legal policy, cannot be readily dismissed.
Analyzing this multi-stage governance process by phases helps to clarify
the Incomplete Contracts Governance Theory. I should emphasize, however,
that by dividing this discussion into numerical stages, I do not mean to imply
that legal construction necessarily follows a sequential order or that the
various aspects of the policymaking, implementation, and enforcement
process can be so neatly separated from each other. Instead, legal
construction is a fluid process of negotiation over legal content among all
involved parties until some equilibrium agreement as to meaning is reached.
Accordingly, the division into phases is for purposes of clarity only.
In Phase One, formal policy is enacted. As has been widely noted by
commentators in law, economics, and political science, numerous interest
groups, including the regulated population itself, are likely to exercise
substantial involvement in the process of formal policy creation. Because
formal policy is necessarily incomplete, however, much legal policy does not
truly begin to gain content until renegotiation at Phase Two, when a variety
of actors with an interest in the new law interpret the regulation, filling in
contractual gaps. In Phase Three, diffusion and institutionalization take place
as a single gap-filling interpretation begins to gain dominance within the
legal and regulated community. In Phase Four, courts and regulatory
agencies are called upon to evaluate the validity of these interpretations. By
solving courts, who he argues zealously defend the rights of their clients, but tend to “accept a broader
definition of client interest.”).
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placing their stamp of approval on a particular interpretation, courts and
regulators lend further credibility to the interpretation, ensuring an even more
wide-spread adoption. Finally, this interpretation becomes the industry
standard, and members of the regulated group that fail to comply with that
standard may be penalized, either by the legal system, by the marketplace, or
by both.
A. Phase One: Formal Policy Enactment and Incomplete Law
In Phase One, new policy is formally enacted. As recognized by virtually
every modern governance theory, numerous interest groups, including the
regulated population itself, are likely to exercise substantial involvement in
the process of formal policy creation. Unfortunately, commentators
sometimes tend to analyze this portion of the governance process in isolation,
examining the degree of interest group involvement and policy outcome,
then concluding that the data is most consistent with a particular governance
model. To continue with the contractual metaphor, the assumption is that the
contract is now complete and that the parties can move on to the
implementation and enforcement stages.
If law were fully articulated and authoritative, as assumed in some legal
formalist models, such an analysis might permit a rich understanding of the
relationship among the numerous parties involved in policy formation and
the impact of that relationship on policymaking and enforcement.116 Because
regulation is frequently ambiguous, poorly articulated, or subject to differing
interpretations, however, the process by which legal policy fully gains
content is only beginning.117 In other words, the contract is incomplete, and
any gaps must be filled in through renegotiation during the implementation
and enforcement phases.
116. Cf. Mark C. Suchman & Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Rational Myths: The New
Institutionalism and the Law and Society Tradition, 21 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 903, 905 (1996) (criticizing
organizational theorists for treating law as “a distinctively explicit, authoritative, and coercive
exogenous constraint on organizational behavior.”) [hereinafter Suchman & Edelman].
117. Id. at 929 (stating that “[b]y treating law as explicit, institutional theory obscures the extent to
which law is, in reality, obscure, fragmented and highly ambiguous.”); Walter W. Powell, Fields of
Practice: Connections Between Law and Organizations, 21 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 959, 959 (1996)
(concurring with “Suchman and Edelman’s contention that institutional analysis has treated law in an
overly deterministic fashion” by “focusing on the letter of the law and its purported impact” rather
than “the extent to which law and the legal environment are subject to negotiation, interpretation, and
contestation.”).
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1. Contractual Incompleteness
The concept of incomplete contracts has been an important one in the
legal and economic literature. According to many economists and legal
scholars, contracts are necessarily incomplete for two basic reasons: the
bounded rationality of the contracting parties and the problem of observable
but unverifiable variables in the contract.118
Bounded rationality in this context stems not only from the inability of
the parties to a contract to foresee all relevant future contingencies, but also
from the fact that, even if the parties could foresee all future events, they
would be unable to negotiate each of these points and reduce their agreement
to a writing understandable and enforceable by a court.119 The problem of
observable but unverifiable contract terms stems from the fact that some of
the contract variables (for example, the effort level of a contracting party)
may be observable to the contracting parties themselves, but may not be
verifiable by courts or other third-party enforcers.120
Additionally, some contracts may be left purposely incomplete, either for
strategic reasons or because the transaction costs of contractual completeness
may exceed the benefits.121 Contractual incompleteness due to transaction
costs is particularly likely if some contingencies have a low probability of
occurrence or require particularly complex drafting.122
118. See OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 23 (1995) [hereinafter
HART, FIRMS]; Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 92-93 (1989) [hereinafter Ayres & Gertner]; Oliver Hart &
John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755, 757 (1988)
[hereinafter Hart & Moore].
119. HART, FIRMS, supra note 118, at 23; Hart & Moore, supra note 118, at 757. Much of the
economic literature ignores the problem of bounded rationality by the contracting parties because of
the difficulty it presents for formal modeling. See, e.g., Hart & Moore, supra note 118, at 757 (stating
that “[w]e ignore the bounded rationality issue, not because we think it is unimportant, but because of
the great difficulty of analyzing it formally.”); Oliver Hart, Norms and the Theory of the Firm, 149 U.
PA. L. REV. 1701, 1703 (2001) (stating that “[f]or reasons of tractability, most of the economics
literature rules out bounded rationality among the contracting parties themselves.”) [hereinafter Hart,
Norms].
120. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC
ECONOMICS § 4.1.4 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 2002) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell];
Hart, Norms, supra note 119, at 1702.
121. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 118, at 94 (arguing that a contractual party may sometimes
withhold information that could make the contract more complete because silence may increase her
share of the gains from contracting); Karen Eggelston et al., The Design and Interpretation of
Contracts: Why Complexity Matters, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 91, 100-101 (2000) (distinguishing perfectly
complete contracts, which differentiate among all relevant world states, and functionally complete
contracts, which are as complete as possible, given problems of bounded rationality and
unverifiability).
122. These transaction costs include legal fees, drafting and printing costs, and the opportunity
cost of negotiation time. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 118, at 92-93. Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole have
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Incomplete contracts create both ex ante and ex post problems. Ex post—
that is, after contracting and at the renegotiation stage—there are gains from
the trade between the two parties to be exploited and the contract may not
fully specify how those gains are to be divided (or one of the contract
variables on which such division depends may not be verifiable by a court).
As a result, each party may attempt to appropriate the common ex post
surplus.123 This possibility raises ex ante implications: if a contracting party
knows that ex post opportunism may take place, she may not make the
efficient level of ex ante relationship-specific investments.124
2. Law As An Incomplete Contract
Drawing on this literature, other scholars have noted the similar
constraints facing lawmakers and have argued that law is similarly, by
definition, incomplete or indeterminate.125 In addition, any law—like any
argued that transaction costs need not prevent formation of complete contracts, given certain
assumptions. Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts, 66
REV. ECON. STUD. 83, 84-85 (1999) [hereinafter Maskin & Tirole]. But see Oliver Hart & John
Moore, Foundations of Incomplete Contracts, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 115, 116 (1999) (arguing that the
Maskin and Tirole critique does not undermine the transaction costs literature).
123. JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 21 (2002) [hereinafter TIROLE].
124. Id. See also HART, FIRMS, supra note 118, at 26-27; Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 120, at
§ 4.1.9.
125. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Preliminary Thoughts On Optimal Tailoring Of Contractual Rules, 3 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 14 (1993) (stating that “the same costs that prevent private parties from
writing fully state-contingent contracts may all the more prevent lawmakers from providing these
default provisions.”); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an
Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 879 (1975) (stating that “the limits of human
foresight, the ambiguities of language, and the high cost of legislative deliberation combine to assure
that most legislation will be enacted in a seriously incomplete form.”); Maskin & Tirole, supra note
122, at 83 (stating that “the mandates of agencies, courts, or legislators make almost no mention of the
many contingencies that may affect the set of feasible options,” and further noting that “this
‘contractual incompleteness’ appears to be important to understanding why the structure of
government matters.”); Katherina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Fiduciary Duty in Transitional Civil Law
Jurisdictions: Lessons from Incomplete Law Theory, European Corporate Governance Institute (Jan. 8,
2002) (unpublished working paper at 9, on file with the author) (arguing that “law is intrinsically
incomplete, meaning that it is impossible to design a law that would specify all future contingencies)
[hereinafter Pistor & Xu].
The notion that law is indeterminate has, of course, been a centerpiece of the Critical Legal
Studies Movement. See generally Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CAL. L. REV. 283 (1989)
(criticizing critical legal studies scholars for this theory and arguing instead that law is only moderately
indeterminate and that this indeterminacy does not undermine its legitimacy). See also Joseph William
Singer, The Player and The Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 12-13 (1984) (arguing
that “[l]egal doctrine is far more indeterminate than traditional theorists realize it is. If traditional legal
theorists are correct about the importance of determinacy to the rule of law, then—by their own
criteria—the rule of law has never existed anywhere.”).
In short, the notion that law is fully determinate seems to have few adherents today. See, e.g., Paul
Schiff Berman, The Cultural Life of Capital Punishment: Surveying the Benefits of a Cultural Analysis
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contract—may be left purposely incomplete, either for strategic or
transaction cost reasons.126 As such, one can predict similar ex ante and ex
post problems with regard to legal commands. For example, if law is
substantially incomplete, then we should expect to see ex post—that is, after
formal policy enactment and at the implementation and enforcement phases
of governance—opportunism by those with a stake in the ex post gains from
new legal rules.127 As discussed in the following Part VI.B, this incomplete
contractual analogy is a nice metaphor for the ex post bargaining among
various interested parties that takes place with respect to ambiguous legal
rules.128
Specifically, an analysis of legal commands as incomplete contracts raises
issues for legal interpretation and enforcement. When law is incomplete,
successful implementation and enforcement will depend on the effectiveness
with which the legal system handles the ex post bargaining process by which
law fully gains content.129
of Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1129, 1133 (2002) (stating that “one is hard pressed to find too many
doctrinaire legal formalists remaining among either academics or legal practitioners.”).
126. For example, when new law is politically contested or presents the danger of substantial
downside risks when events turn out poorly but provides few corresponding benefits for which
legislators can credibly claim responsibility when things go well, legislators may seek to maximize
their opportunities for re-election by opting for incomplete law, thus forcing ex post enforcers such as
courts or regulatory agencies to fill gaps and resolve ambiguities. Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec,
The Penalty Default Canon (2003) (working draft on file with author) [hereinafter Baker & Krawiec].
Law may also be left incomplete for socially beneficial reasons, such as reducing the transaction costs
associated with defining ex ante all of the future contingencies to which the law must apply, and
delegating to an agency with more time and expertise the responsibility for defining some terms. Id.
127. I do not mean to suggest here that rules, because of their greater specificity, are inevitably
preferable to standards. Instead, the point is merely that standards have costs, as well as benefits, and
that those costs and benefits must be balanced. See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:
An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992) (discussing the relative costs and benefits of
standards and rules).
128. See infra notes 130-63 and accompanying text. Similarly, an analysis of laws as incomplete
contracts raises the possibility (not addressed in this Article) that the likelihood of ex post rent-seeking
will alter the ex ante investment incentives to influence legal policy. As such, one might expect to find
too little investment in the procurement of legal rules, too much, or investment primarily in nonspecific lobbying efforts, depending on a variety of factors. See Baker & Krawiec, supra note 126.
129. Pistor & Xu, supra note 125, at 6. Pistor and Xu argue that a second-best efficient result can
be achieved by properly delegating enforcement and residual policymaking authority to the correct
policymaking body—that is, to a court, a legislature, or a regulatory body, depending on a variety of
factors. Id. Rather than engaging the large existing literature on institutional choice, this Article merely
argues that all three policymaking bodies face serious constraints to developing efficient policy in the
face of legal incompleteness. This does not necessarily mean, however, that all policymaking bodies
respond similarly to legal incompleteness. See Baker & Krawiec, supra note 126. See also infra notes
164-66 and accompanying text.
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B. Phase Two: Contractual Gap Filling
In Phase Two, new law begins to gain content. To properly understand
this process, it is important to recognize that members of the regulated group
itself (for example, executives at business organizations) rarely learn of new
law on their own.130 In other words, many governance models implicitly
assume that business organizations know what the law is. Although initially
credible, this assumption misses an extremely important step in the
regulatory process. The reality is that legal systems have no systematic
apparatus for ensuring that the regulated population is aware of the laws
governing it.131 Although formal legal publications exist in abundance, they
are generally only accessible to those with both the inclination and the
expertise to understand them. As a result, business organizations tend to learn
about new laws from a variety of unofficial sources: the media, legal
compliance professionals, and networks of similarly situated business
organizations.
The incompleteness of law complicates this process. When law is
incomplete, the aforementioned legal “middlemen”—as well as
policymakers, interest groups, and the regulated group itself—must all
negotiate the meaning of law before the contract is fully articulated. Each of
these actors, in turn, brings self-interested and partisan motives to the
renegotiation process.
1. Legal Compliance Professionals
The role of legal compliance professionals is especially important in this
process of legal interpretation. Observers should not make the mistake of
assuming that legal compliance professionals are unbiased filters for new
legal rules. Instead, legal compliance professionals bring a variety of
motivations and biases to bear when constructing the legal regime.132
130. Langevoort, supra note 51, at 823 (stating that most corporate directors have no first hand
knowledge of the laws regulating their conduct as board members and instead rely on their lawyers’
advice as to what the law requires of them); Daniel J. Givelber et al., Tarasoff: Myth and Reality: An
Empirical Study of Private Law in Action, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 443, 443 (1984) (noting that “if the
Court’s ruling [in Tarasoff] was to enhance public safety, someone had to tell the therapists about their
new obligation and how to meet it.”) [hereinafter Givelber et al.].
131. Suchman & Edelman, supra note 116, at 930-31.
132. Legal compliance professionals are not the only professional group that may construct legal
obligations in a self-interested manner. For example, psychiatric professional organizations may have
constructed Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. Of Cal., a 1976 case holding that psychotherapists owe a
duty of care to third parties whom their patients have threatened to harm, in a manner that reflects the
concerns of mental health care professionals. See Givelber et al., supra note 130, at 446. See also
Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 13 Cal.3d 177, 529 P.2d 553 (1974), withdrawn and replaced
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As a result, legal compliance professionals may value incompleteness in
the law because, as the first-line interpreters of legal policy, they are able to
fill any gaps in incomplete law with terms that enhance the welfare of the
legal compliance profession. Although legal compliance professionals, like
other special interest groups, can—and do—directly lobby legislatures for
the provision of favorable legal rules, legal compliance professionals
(because of their superior access, expertise, and understanding of the judicial
and regulatory systems) may have more success at lower cost by gap-filling
vague law, rather than by directly lobbying the legislature for statutes that
explicitly favor the legal profession.133
Some commentators, for example, explicitly assert that, because legal
professionals are able to appropriate the rents generated by incomplete law,
they have an inherent interest in vague laws.134 Others, such as Professors
Donald Langevoort and Robert K. Rasmussen, suggest more indirect means
by which legal professionals may benefit from vague legal standards.
Specifically, Langevoort and Rasmussen predict that lawyers will
systematically tend to overstate legal risks when advising clients—a
prediction supported by some empirical evidence.135 Presumably, this
overstatement is easier to accomplish with a vague legal command, as
opposed to a legal rule that clearly delineates legal obligations. In addition,
legal compliance professionals have an incentive to recommend means of
containing legal risk or legal ambiguity that require substantial involvement
by 17 Cal.3d 425, 551 P.2d 334 (1976). Furthermore, the empirical data suggests that most therapists
learned of the obligations imposed by Tarasoff through these professional organizations, rather than
through lawyers or primary legal sources. Givelber et al., supra note 130, at 460.
133. Macey & Miller, infra note 134, at 473 (discussing the special expertise, access, and
influence over the Delaware judiciary enjoyed by the Delaware bar). This is not to say that legal
compliance professionals, and lawyers in particular, do not actively lobby the legislature when it is in
their best interests to do so. Indeed, there is substantial evidence to the contrary. Instead, my point is
merely that such lobbying will often be unnecessary due to legal compliance professionals’ control
over the gap-filling process.
134. See, e.g., Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate
Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908 (1998); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward An InterestGroup Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 505 (1987) (stating that “[t]he bar
therefore has some interest in reducing the clarity of Delaware law to enhance the amount of
litigation.”) [hereinafter Macey & Miller].
135. Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of Lawyers in
Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375 (1997) [hereinafter Langevoort &
Rasmussen]. See infra notes 146-51, 159-63, and accompanying text (discussing the empirical
evidence supporting this theory). Although Macey, Miller, Langevoort, and Rasmussen specifically
address only lawyers, their arguments should apply to non-lawyer legal advisers as well, such as
human resource and other compliance personnel. The empirical evidence supports this prediction and
indicates that—like lawyers—non-lawyer compliance professionals also value vague legal commands
and respond to such commands by overstating legal risk. See infra notes 146-51, 159-63, and
accompanying text.
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by legal compliance professionals and fall squarely within their area of
expertise such as drafting contracts, employee manuals, or other materials in
a particular manner; observing certain hiring, firing, and promotion practices;
or requiring certain types of employee training.
As noted by Langevoort and Rasmussen, legal compliance professionals
may overstate legal risks because to do so is a wealth-maximizing strategy.136
When legal risks are more severe, the more valuable are the services of
professionals who can contain that risk. This is especially true if the
containment strategy itself requires extensive legal work, thus increasing
legal fees.137 Legal compliance professionals may also overstate risks out of a
rational concern for reputation protection.138
The fact that legal compliance professionals have economic incentives to
overstate legal risks does not mean, however, that such overstatement is
conscious or purposeful. Instead, legal compliance professionals may
unconsciously overstate legal risks, either because professional norms dictate
excessive caution139 or because the legal resources from which many legal
professionals gain their knowledge of the law are themselves biased.140
Perhaps most importantly, legal professionals may overstate legal risk
because the professional has truly convinced herself that what is in her own
best interest is also in the client’s best interest.141 In other words, legal
compliance professionals—like human beings generally—may suffer from a
136. Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 135, at 380. In the case of outside counsel or
consultants, this wealth maximization takes the form of increased legal fees. In the case of in-house
personnel, it takes the form of increased importance, prestige, and resources for the legal or
compliance department. Id. at 416.
137. Id. at 392. Naturally, there are some market constraints on the ability of legal professionals to
overstate risk. Professors Langevoort and Rasmussen convincingly demonstrate, however, that these
constraints are not perfect for a variety of reasons, including information asymmetries in the market
for legal services. Id. at 381.
138. Id. at 394. For example, legal professionals may be able to decrease the reputational penalty
for structuring a transaction that turns out to be disallowed by courts or regulators by overstating the
risk an event will occur. Id. at 396. Similarly, there may be an asymmetry between the observability of
good and bad legal advice that renders lawyers rationally over-cautious. In other words, there is often
no real evidence that legal advice has been correct, whereas the evidence that legal advice has been
incorrect is often quite clear: the transaction is disallowed or the client is found liable. Id. at 377-78.
139. Id. at 413. For example, “lawyers might understand their proper role as one in which the
primary duty is to warn clients about the presence of legal risks, to assure that no client ever
underestimates the presence of prevailing legal rules or standards.” Id. In the end, however,
Langevoort and Rasmussen reject this explanation as being separate from the economic interest
explanation. In other words, norms arise and survive only if they serve some purpose. The most
obvious purpose served by the norm of overcaution is that it enhances the welfare of the legal
profession. Id. at 414.
140. Id. at 434-36. See also infra notes 146-51, 159-63, and accompanying text (discussing a
substantial bias in secondary legal sources toward overstating legal risk).
141. Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 135, at 428.

p487 Krawiec book pages.doc10/27/03 11:42 AM

2003]

COSMETIC COMPLIANCE

531

self-serving bias under certain circumstances.
A large body of psychological research indicates that desires often
dramatically impact information interpretation, even by those who
consciously strive for objectivity and impartiality.142 Self-serving bias is
particularly likely to emerge when information is ambiguous and thus subject
to differing interpretations.143 In addition, the self-serving bias is likely to be
strongest when a person is endorsing another’s biased opinion that comports
with the listener’s self-interest, as opposed to making an original decision on
her own.144 In this manner, it is easy to see how a biased interpretation of
ambiguous law takes hold in the legal community and becomes reinforcing
as more people subscribe to it—a phenomenon sometimes referred to as an
information cascade.145
Researchers have identified several instances in which legal compliance
professionals appear to have vastly overstated legal risk. One study, for
example, analyzed articles in personnel journals, practitioner-oriented legal
journals, and academic-oriented law reviews concerning the threat of
wrongful discharge suits.146 They found that personnel and legal practitioner
journals significantly inflated the risk of wrongful discharge lawsuits, often
through the use of alarmist or extreme language that overstated both the
frequency of such suits and the rates at which plaintiffs prevailed.147 This was
142. MAX BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 2 (4th ed. 1998) (arguing
that audit failure is inevitable because it is psychologically impossible for auditors to maintain
objectivity in the face of self-serving bias); Linda Babcock & George Lowenstein, Explaining
Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases, 11(1) J. ECON. PERSP. 109-10 (1997) (stating,
“although psychologists debate the underlying cause of self-serving bias, its existence is rarely
questioned,” and presenting results from empirical and field research work that documents the selfserving bias and establishes its connection to bargaining impasse); Max H. Bazerman et al., Why Good
Accountants Do Bad Audits, HARV. BUS. REV. 97, 98 (Nov. 2002) [hereinafter Bazerman et al.];
David Messick & Keith Sentis, Fairness and Preference, 15 (4) J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 418
(1979) (finding that experiment subjects’ decisions regarding the fair division of wages were biased in
the direction of their own self-interests).
143. Bazerman et al., supra note 142, at 98.
144. Id. at 99. Kristina A. Diekmann et al., Self-Interest and Fairness in Problems of Resource
Allocation: Allocators Versus Recipients, J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL., 1061, 1062 (May
1997).
145. Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades And Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 683, 721 (1999) (stating, “[a] strictly informational cascade occurs when people start attaching
credibility to a proposition P (e.g., a certain abandoned waste dump is dangerous) merely because
other people seem to accept P.”).
146. See generally Lauren B. Edelman et al., Professional Construction of Law: The Inflated
Threat of Wrongful Discharge, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 47 (1992) [hereinafter Professional
Construction of Law].
147. Id. at 64. One article, for example, referred to “the explosion of wrongful discharge
litigation.” See Charles G. Bakaly, Jr. & Joel M. Grossman, How to Avoid Wrongful Discharge Suits,
73 MGMT. REV. 41, 41 (1984) (quoted in Professional Construction of Law, supra note 146, at 64).
Another stated that “wrongful discharge lawsuits are proliferating across the country against
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despite the fact that both the researchers’ own statistics as well as a RAND
study concluded that the cost to employers from wrongful discharge suits
was slight.148 Similar results have been found with respect to internal
grievance procedures149 and securities law.150 Needless to say, the solutions
to these threats advocated by legal compliance professionals are often within
their field of expertise and could generate substantial revenues.151
Legal compliance professionals construct law and then pass that
construction on to others with an interest in the meaning of law (such as
courts, agencies, and the regulated group) through a variety of mechanisms,
including: advising clients; writing journal or periodical articles; speaking at
seminars; presenting legal arguments to courts and regulators; and lobbying
policymakers or otherwise playing a direct role in policy drafting.152 Perhaps
most importantly, legal compliance professionals construct law through a
variety of professional networks, a phenomenon discussed below in Part
VI.C.
employers.” David A. Bradshaw & Linda Van Winkle Deacon, Wrongful Discharge: The Tip of the
Iceberg?, 30 PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATOR 74, 74 (1985). Law practitioner-oriented journals were
somewhat more accurate, but still on the whole substantially over-stated the legal risk of wrongful
discharge suits. Academic-oriented law review articles, by contrast, were much more even-handed and
tended to emphasize that the risk of such suits, while increasing, was still quite small. Professional
Construction of Law, supra note 146, at 68-69.
148. Professional Construction of Law, supra note 146, at 53-60. The RAND study, for example,
concluded that, “Despite the uproar over wrongful termination litigation, the aggregate legal costs are
really not very large . . . [T]he annual cost of jury trials sums to $2.56 per worker.” JAMES N.
DERTOUZOS ET AL., THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF WRONGFUL TERMINATION ix
(1988). The Edelman study returned even lower numbers than the RAND study for a variety of
reasons. Id. at 52, 54-55.
149. See infra notes 172-77 and accompanying text (discussing legal professionals’ construction
of grievance procedures as a protection against EEO litigation).
150. For example, the district court case of Escott v. Barchris Construction Co., 283 F. Supp. 643
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), which imposed a heightened due diligence standard under section 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933 on parties involved in a public offering of securities, generated an abundance of
fairly alarmist commentary advising potentially liable parties on a variety of costly steps that should be
undertaken in order to qualify for the due diligence defense. Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note
135, at 435. Later case law, which signaled a more obliging attitude toward issuers and other
potentially liable parties under section 11 did not receive comparable attention. This construction of
section 11 liability may have added substantial costs to the public offering process. Id.
151. For example, the solutions advocated to control the risk of wrongful discharge suits typically
include a variety of personnel practices, such as the formalization and standardization of hiring, firing,
and evaluation practices in a manner that protects employers from claims of wrongful discharge, and
the use of protective employment-at-will clauses in employee manuals, contracts, and other
documents. Professional Construction of Law, supra note 146, at 76.
152. Suchman & Cahill, infra note 163, at 683.
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2. The Regulated Group: Business Organizations
Business organizations, as the group subject to new policy, also play an
important role in constructing the meaning of law. Although, as previously
discussed, business executives are unlikely to learn about new laws directly
from primary sources, this does not mean that they are uninvolved in
constructing the legal regime by which their actions will be governed. Senior
management of business organizations, for example, may seek to disrupt
current practice as little as possible, while still assuring courts and regulatory
agencies that they have met the goals of any new policy. As a result, they
may press an interpretation of law that signals compliance with the relevant
legal regime, but fails to fulfill the normative goals of regulation. Similarly,
management may resist interpretations offered by other parties to the
negotiation process (for example, legal compliance professionals, courts, or
agencies) that they believe overly constrain management discretion or disrupt
current business practices.
Organizational management thus may resist legal constructions that hold,
for example, that the prohibition against discrimination contained in EEO
law requires affirmative action or that the implied contract theory of
wrongful discharge requires that employees be fired only for cause, because
such constructions overly restrict management’s hiring and firing authority.
Instead, they may press—or at least be receptive to—a construction that
holds that EEO law requires equal employment policies and diversity
training in order to shield employers from liability, or holds that the implied
contract theory of wrongful discharge requires employers to include
“employment-at-will” clauses in employee manuals, in order to preserve
management’s discretion to fire employees without cause.153 As these
constructions are often likely to be more palatable to legal compliance
professionals as well (because their implementation requires a greater
involvement by such professionals), a consensus may develop relatively
quickly as to what is the most appropriate response to new policy. In other
words, the accepted gap-filling construction of an incomplete law represents
an equilibrium agreement among legal professionals, the regulated group,
and the regulator or court.
The role of interdepartmental rivalry as sub-units within the organization
struggle for position, prestige, and access to limited resources should also not
153. Professional Construction of Law, supra note 146, at 79 (discussing the diffusion of this
particular construction of wrongful discharge law). As previously discussed, EEO hiring policies and
diversity training are liability mitigators only against certain claims under EEO law, such as hostile
environment harassment or punitive damages for intentional discrimination. See supra Part III.B.
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be overlooked when considering business organizations’ construction of law.
If one interpretation will enhance the power of a unit—say legal
compliance—relative to other units, then it is likely that managers of that unit
will actively advance the interpretation that most benefits their department.154
C. Phase Three: Diffusion and Institutionalization
The previous subsection explored the motivations of various groups
affected by legal policy to fill any gaps in incomplete laws with terms that
further their own self-interest. One might still question, however, why their
interpretations are so similar. Surely there is more than one legal
interpretation that would serve the interests of legal compliance professionals
and the business community. How, then, does some consensus arise as to
what the law “is”? In this subsection, I discuss the important role of
professional networks in the standardization, diffusion, and ultimate
institutionalization of a particular legal construction.
As a legal construction begins to emerge within the regulated group and
the legal compliance professionals that serve it, professional networks play
an extremely important role in the standardization and diffusion of that
construction across the relevant community.155 These networks include
professional associations and their regular gatherings and newsletters;
commercial workshops and education courses on legal compliance;
professional communications via the internet; and professional publications
such as periodicals, books, treatises, memoranda to clients’ and articles in
professional and academic journals.156
Like legal compliance professionals generally, producers of these items
bring a self-interested agenda to bear when constructing the law. For
example, legal constructions that are alarmist may generate more interest,
154. For example, some empirical studies trace a proliferation of certain personnel practices, such
as job evaluation and promotion testing, to attempts by personnel professionals to establish and
maintain their strategic position within firms during the 1940s, a time when union activity was on the
rise, and personnel professionals marketed themselves as having the ability to constrain union power.
See, e.g., James P. Baron et al., War and Peace: The Evolution of Modern Personnel Administration in
U.S. Industry, 92 AM. J. SOC. 250 (1986).
155. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational
Myth, 105 AM. J. SOC., 406, 412 (1999) [hereinafter Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal
Regulation]. Other professions may be responsible for the diffusion and institutionalization of certain
industry practices as well. For example, accountants may have played a role in the diffusion and
institutionalization of certain financial reporting practices across Fortune 200 corporations. Stephen J.
Mezias, An Institutional Model of Organizational Practice: Financial Reporting at the Fortune 200,
35 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 431 (1990).
156. Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 135, at 434; Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal
Regulation, supra note 155, at 412.
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and thus higher sales, than legal constructions that are more measured.157
Similarly, most readers of secondary sources may desire a short, clear, and
understandable legal construction. As a result, qualifications and nuanced
interpretations may be rejected in favor of a simplistic construction that
misstates regulations and court rulings to a significant degree. Finally, many
of these materials are produced by legal compliance professionals as a means
to attract clients. Consequently, there is an incentive to overstate not only
legal risk, but also the ability of legal compliance professionals to manage
that risk through creative devices and interpretations.158
As a result, several studies have shown that personnel- and practioneroriented legal journals tend to significantly overstate legal risk.159
Furthermore, such publications tend to employ alarmist and unqualified
language, especially in the title or headline, and rarely provide numbers or
empirical data to back up their claims.160 Even when statistical data is
provided, the articles rarely include citations to the studies that produced the
data, making the validity of the claims difficult to evaluate.161 Finally, some
of the reported data is so inconsistent with the findings of any known studies
as to render the validity of their claims doubtful, or in some cases even
absurd.162
Despite these problems, particular legal constructions seem to diffuse
quickly and pervasively once legal compliance professionals have reached
some consensus on the most appropriate interpretation. For example, as
discussed in Part VII, legal professionals’ construction of wrongful discharge
law and the value of grievance procedures in Title VII litigation diffused
157. Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 135, at 434; Langevoort, supra note 51, at 823.
158. Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 135, at 434.
159. See, e.g., Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation, supra note 155, at 446
(demonstrating that personnel- and practioner-oriented legal publications during the 1980s
significantly overstated the legal benefits of internal grievance procedures); Professional Construction
of Law, supra note 146, at 64-65. Academic journals, by contrast, present a more even-handed view of
the law.
160. Id. at 64-65; Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation, supra note 155, at 418 n.7
and accompanying text. Professor Marc Galanter has noted a similar phenomenon with respect to the
accepted wisdom on litigation. See Marc Galanter, Predators and Parasites: Lawyer-Bashing and
Civil Justice, 28 GA. L. REV. 633, 644 (1994) (discussing “a series of factoids or macro-anecdotes
about litigation [that] became the received wisdom.”); Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of
Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know (and Think We Know) about Our Allegedly Contentious
and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 62 (1983) (discussing “familiar nuggets and favorite horror
stories” designed to alarm the reader that eventually come to be taken as fact).
161. Professional Construction of Law, supra note 146, at 64-65; Edelman et al., The Endogeneity
of Legal Regulation, supra note 155, at 418 n.7 and accompanying text.
162. Professional Construction of Law, supra note 146, at 64-65.
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exponentially, despite evidence that these constructions had little basis in law
at the time that they were made.163
D. Phase Four: Formal Legitimation—The Role of Courts and Agencies
Courts and regulatory agencies also play an important role in filling the
gaps in incomplete law. As consensus on a particular gap-filling construction
emerges and becomes institutionalized by the regulated group and the legal
compliance community, courts and agencies are called upon to determine
whether that interpretation comports with the contract terms as originally
envisioned. Although in theory this is the point at which the court or agency
could reject the emerging interpretation as inconsistent with the original
policy goals (and thus with the contract terms), this may not happen for a
variety of reasons.
Courts and agencies alike may be faced with limited expertise, time,
budgets, and imperfect guidance on what will serve as compliance with
law.164 Business organizations and legal compliance professionals, in turn, do
their best to package the chosen construction as consistent with the public
interest and the original goals of regulation. As a result, courts and regulatory
bodies frequently measure compliance with the law against the industry
standard, with little inquiry into the role played by the regulated group and
other self-interested actors in establishing those standards.165 Furthermore,
because courts are reactive, deciding only the cases and controversies
brought before them, they rarely independently devise potential means of
163. See infra Part VII. Not all examples of policy construction and diffusion by legal
professionals carry such negative consequences for social welfare. For example, Mark Suchman and
Mia Cahill have demonstrated the important role played by Silicon Valley lawyers in constructing
positive norms of venture capital practice, many of which eventually became institutionalized in the
national legal regime. Mark C. Suchman & Mia L. Cahill, The Hired Gun as Facilitator: Lawyers and
the Suppression of Business Disputes in Silicon Valley, 21 L. & SOC. INQ. 679 (1996) [hereinafter
Suchman & Cahill]. Similarly, Professor Ronald Gilson has documented the positive role played by
lawyers in reducing transaction costs. Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Lawyers: Legal Skills and
Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239 (1984). For more on value creation by lawyers, see generally
Symposium: Business Lawyering and Value Creation for Clients, 74 OR. L. REV. 1 (1995).
164. Suchman & Edelman, supra note 116, at 934. Although it is often argued that administrative
agencies have an advantage over courts in terms of time and expertise, administrative agencies also
suffer from these deficiencies to some degree and, in addition, are considered more susceptible to
industry capture. MASHAW, supra note 110, at 21. As a result, although courts, administrative bodies,
and legislatures may perform differently in the face of incomplete law, the point here is simply that all
three governmental branches face serious constraints in their responses to legal incompleteness.
165. Suchman & Edelman, supra note 116, at 939. This is not to imply that courts and agencies
inevitably rubber stamp all industry standards. Indeed, several prominent rulings have held that such
standards and customs are inadequate to comply with the law. Instead, the point is that courts and
agencies often provide some deference to apparently successful industry responses to law, thus
favoring the status quo.

p487 Krawiec book pages.doc10/27/03 11:42 AM

2003]

COSMETIC COMPLIANCE

537

complying with the law. Although judicial rulings may indicate which
existing methods of attempting compliance do or do not comport with a law,
courts are unlikely to simply invent new methods of compliance that have
not already been employed with apparent success by at least some members
of the regulated group.166
VII. AN ILLUSTRATION: GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES AND WORKPLACE
HARASSMENT
This Part analyzes the process by which internal grievance procedures
gained legitimacy as an organizational defense against workplace harassment
liability under Title VII. This analysis provides a concrete illustration of the
Incomplete Contracts Governance Theory developed in the previous Part VI,
and highlights the roles played by incomplete law, legal gap-filling, and
private interest groups (especially legal compliance professionals) in the rise
of internal compliance structures as a liability mitigator.
Title VII, along with the changing societal norms that led to its enactment,
created important new rights for large categories of American workers. Title
VII, however, is notoriously incomplete, leaving important categories of
information undefined. For example, although the statute prohibits
discrimination, it does not define what constitutes discrimination or how
employers may demonstrate nondiscrimination in court. As a result,
employers and other groups with an interest in the legislation were left to
gap-fill the many incomplete terms of Title VII, by defining for themselves
some of these categories in order to attempt compliance with the new law.
This Part VII will demonstrate that legal compliance professionals, in
particular, played an active role in construing employers’ new obligations
and the protections from liability that the new laws afforded them.167 As will
be shown, the preferred construction relied heavily on internal compliance
structures such as affirmative action offices and internal grievance
mechanisms, which quickly proliferated.168 Eventually, courts were called
upon to determine whether, through the use of such mechanisms, employers
had met their new obligations under Title VII. By and large, as predicted by
the Incomplete Contracts Governance Theory, courts deferred to the policies
and procedures that employers had developed and that were becoming
commonplace in the business community.169 As previously discussed,
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 939.
Id. at 924.
Id.
Id.
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however, the effectiveness of these internal compliance structures is largely
unproven, and, in fact, several empirical studies throw doubt on their
effectiveness. If it is true that internal compliance structures such as these are
ineffective means of reducing workplace discrimination, then the gap-filling
of Title VII with terms dependant on internal compliance structures as an
organizational liability determinant represents not only a frustration of any
public-regarding purposes of Title VII170 but a wealth transfer from the
intended beneficiaries of Title VII to business organizations and legal
compliance professionals.
These phenomena are highlighted in detail in a recent study of grievance
procedures and EEO law by Professors Lauren B. Edelman, Christopher
Uggen, and Howard S. Erlanger that examined the relationships between
formal pronouncements of law, professional construction of law, and the
impact of that construction on later court determinations of legal
requirements. In doing so, they reviewed articles in personnel, management,
and legal journals from 1964 to 1989 that addressed grievance procedures in
the context of EEO law.171
These articles tended to make two strong claims with regard to the impact
of grievance procedures on legal liability. First, they claimed that because
internal grievance procedures provided an alternative forum for dispute
resolution, their presence reduced the incidence of complaints to external
agencies and courts.172 Second, these articles asserted that if external
complaints were nonetheless filed against an employer with internal
grievance procedures, courts would reward the organization for attempting to
provide due process within the organization itself.173
At the time these articles were written, however, there was very little legal
basis for such claims. Contrary to the predictions of the legal compliance
literature, internal EEO grievance procedures had almost no impact on the
170. This is not intended to imply that the legislature had such a public-regarding purpose when
enacting Title VII. As recognized by public choice theorists, it is entirely possible that Congress
purposely left Title VII incomplete in order to meet the demands of special interests groups such as
business organizations, while at the same time providing the illusion of public service to other
constituents. See Baker & Krawiec, supra note 126 (discussing strategic delegations).
171. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation, supra note 155, at 413.
172. Id. For example, a 1984 article claiming that “A good grievance procedure . . . deters
employees from seeking representation by outsiders” is typical. Peter M. Panken, What Every
Company Should Have: A Formal Employee Complaint Procedure, 73 MGMT. REV. 42-45 (1984)
(quoted in Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation, supra note 155, at 414). Similarly, a
1985 article claimed that “[i]f an employee can get a fair hearing through a grievance system, there is
less chance this employee will be tempted to go to the courts.” Thomas J. Condon, Use Union Methods
in Handling Grievances, 64 PERSONNEL J. 72-75 (1985) (quoted in Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of
Legal Regulation, supra note 155, at 412).
173. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation, supra note 155, at 412.
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number of external complaints and actually increased the number of internal
complaints.174 Similarly, the literature’s claims that employers could reduce
or eliminate liability through the use of internal grievance procedures had
little basis in law at the time they were made. At the time that the articles
were written, almost all discrimination claims were decided under a vicarious
liability standard. As such, the employer’s liability should be automatic
without regard to the presence of grievance procedures or other internal
compliance structures.175
In fact, prior to the Supreme Court’s 1986 decision in Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson, the grievance procedure defense was raised in only thirteen
employment discrimination cases, and only six of those courts indicated
some willingness to consider grievance procedures as a mitigating factor
when determining liability.176 It is doubtful that these six district court cases,
which received very little publicity, were responsible for (or could justify)
the broad claims in the legal compliance literature regarding the value of
grievance procedures as a litigation insulation device.177
Employers, however, seemed to be unaware that the advice rendered by
legal compliance professionals was wrong. Edelman and her team document
a steady diffusion of grievance procedures that coincides with the advocacy
of such procedures in the legal compliance literature.178 The
institutionalization of grievance procedures as a response to EEO law
apparently began with just a few employers likely to be most sensitive to
their legal environments (principally federal contractors, federal agencies,
universities, and organizations that had been the subject of a prior
discrimination suit) and steadily spread throughout the time frame of the
study.179
Perhaps most interesting, however, with the recognition in Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson of a new theory of workplace harassment—hostile
environment harassment—that replaced the vicarious liability standard with a
174. Id. at 427. This should not be interpreted as a sign that discrimination actually increased in
these organizations. Instead, it is likely that the presence of EEO grievance officers signaled a culture
that encouraged attention to the problem of discrimination and in which aggrieved employees felt
more comfortable asserting their rights. As a result, it is difficult to know the impact, if any, of
grievance procedures on the incidence of discrimination within organizations. Id. at 420.
175. Id. at 432. In fact, very few cases prior to the mid-1980s even discussed grievance
procedures. Id.
176. Id. at 439. Of those six, in only four did the court actually consider the employer’s grievance
procedures as a mitigating factor. In the other two cases, the grievance procedures in question were too
inadequate to merit such consideration. Id.
177. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that none of the publications cited any of the six
cases. Id.
178. Id. at 451.
179. Id.
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standard of direct liability, the previously erroneous claims of the legal
compliance literature suddenly gained validity. When recognizing hostile
work environment harassment as a viable claim in Meritor, the Supreme
Court explicitly noted that, although Meritor’s grievance procedures were
inadequate to protect the defendant from liability (because they required the
alleged victim to complain directly to her harasser), a more carefully
conceived grievance procedure might provide legal protection.180
Edelman and her co-authors conclude that Meritor legitimated the
grievance procedure defense. At the time of their study, there had been 116
cases decided since Meritor that raised the grievance procedure defense. In
ninety-one percent of the cases, the court indicated that a well-structured
grievance procedure could insulate the employer from liability, and in thirtysix percent of the cases the employer’s grievance procedures did so insulate
the employer.181 The study data further show that courts are becoming
increasingly likely to defer to employers’ grievance procedures when
determining liability.182 As a result, courts are not only accepting, but are
reinforcing, a construction of discrimination law that includes grievance
procedures.
The legal compliance professionals’ claims as to the insulating effects of
internal grievance procedures became fully entrenched within the formal
legal structure with the Supreme Court’s 1998 case of Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, which established an affirmative defense based on the defendant
employer’s grievance procedures.183 With Faragher, the process of
constructing EEO law came full circle, as legal compliance professionals
invoked Faragher in stepping up their advocacy for grievance procedures as
a protection against EEO liability, and business organizations predictably
responded by implementing grievance procedures to an even greater
degree.184
180. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). As the Court stated:
[T]he bank’s grievance procedure apparently required an employee to complain first to her
supervisor, in this case Taylor. Since Taylor was the alleged perpetrator, it is not altogether
surprising that respondent failed to invoke the procedure and report her grievance to him.
Petitioner’s contention that respondent’s failure should insulate it from liability might be
substantially stronger if its procedures were better calculated to encourage victims of harassment
to come forward.
Id. at 72-73.
181. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation, supra note 155, at 440.
182. Id. at 442.
183. 524 U.S. 775, 807-08 (1998). See also supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text (discussing
the affirmative defense).
184. See, e.g., Ellen McLaughlin & Carol Merchasin, Training Becomes Important Step to Avoid
Liability, NAT’L. L.J. Jan. 29, 2001, at B10 (stating that “[t]raining a work force on a company’s antidiscrimination/harassment policy has thus become arguably the most important tool for an employer
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One should not assume, of course, that merely because grievance
procedures were advocated by legal compliance professionals for arguably
self-serving reasons that they are necessarily an ineffective response to the
demands of EEO law. Unfortunately, this is a difficult empirical point to
resolve because only the incidence of discrimination complaints—and not
the incidence of discrimination itself—is observable.185
Nonetheless, there are reasons to approach the Court’s legitimization of
such procedures with caution. First, the unencouraging data, discussed in Part
IV, regarding the effectiveness of other types of internal compliance
structures should raise suspicions regarding grievance procedures until
empirical data documenting their effectiveness emerges. Second, courts are
not well-situated to make ex post determinations regarding whether a
particular organization’s grievance procedures are effective, and a review of
the case law indicates that some courts do not even attempt this task.186
Finally, employees may have valid reasons for foregoing internal grievance
procedures, such as a fear of retaliation or not being believed, as well as
concerns about the pro-management bias of complaint handlers.187
VIII. CONCLUSION
This Article analyzes the role of one type of extremely prevalent and
quickly growing negotiated governance mechanism—internal compliance
structures—as a liability determinant in a variety of legal contexts, including
environmental, tort, employment discrimination, corporate, securities, and
health care law. An examination of the empirical evidence surrounding the
that wants to protect itself from Title VII liability and punitive damages”); Training’s Impact on
Harassment Lawsuits, MANAGING TRAINING & DEV., Feb. 1, 2002, at 1 (stating that “a swift response,
including diversity training, can save employers from expensive and costly liability lawsuits.”).
185. As previously noted, the presence of internal grievance procedures increases the incidence of
discrimination complaints. This is likely attributable, however, to the fact that aggrieved employees
are more aware of their rights and more willing to bring complaints in an environment where
discrimination law has been made more salient by the presence of EEO grievance officers. See supra
note 174 and accompanying text (discussing this point).
186. See supra notes 64 and 66-67, and accompanying text (discussing several lower court cases).
187. Linda Hamilton Krieger, Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment–Normative, Descriptive,
and Doctrinal Interactions: A Reply to Professors Beiner and Bisom-Rapp, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK
L. REV. 169, 181-85 (2001) (noting that survey data reveals that only 2-15% of sexual harassment
victims utilize employers’ official internal complaint processes for reasons that include: beliefs that
informal avenues are more effective; fear of blame, retaliation, or not being believed; and concerns
regarding the effectiveness of internal complaint procedures); Theresa M. Beiner, Sex, Science, &
Social Knowledge: The Implications of Social Science Research on Imputing Liability to Employers
for Sexual Harassment, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 273, 307-23 (2001) (discussing a variety of
reasons for the underreporting of sexual harassment, including a failure to identify the relevant conduct
as legally constituting harassment, and fears of retaliation, harm to their career, or not being believed).
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efficacy of internal compliance structures in deterring prohibited conduct
leads to the conclusion that the available empirical evidence does not support
the legal regime’s enthusiastic embrace of such structures. Indeed, the most
large-scale and methodologically sound studies to date provide no evidence
that internal compliance structures reduce the incidence of prohibited
conduct within firms. Instead, these studies provide empirical support for the
conclusion that internal compliance structures are largely window-dressing
mechanisms implemented by corporate management to reduce liability or
provide the appearance of legitimacy to corporate stakeholders and the
marketplace at large.
This leads to a broader, related conclusion: the negotiated governance
model faces both empirical and theoretical hurdles that its proponents have
not yet overcome. First, as an empirical matter, although internal compliance
structures are only one form of negotiated governance, the poor empirical
showing of internal compliance structures in reducing prohibited conduct
calls into question the increasing influence of negotiated governance models
that seek a more cooperative approach to the regulation of business
organizations. Second, as a theoretical matter, the negotiated governance
model contains an internal inconsistency in that the theory itself, if taken to
its logical conclusion, implies results at odds with those predicted by the
model’s proponents. Specifically, to the extent that governance is properly
viewed as a set of negotiated relationships or related contracts, these
contracts and relationships—like contracts generally—are highly incomplete.
Accordingly, the economic and legal literature on incomplete contracts
predicts the likelihood of opportunistic rent-seeking behavior during
renegotiation.
Drawing on this literature, the Incomplete Contracts Governance Theory
developed in this Article predicts and empirically documents similar
opportunistic behavior during the renegotiation of incomplete law—that is,
during the implementation and enforcement phases of governance. This is in
contrast to most proponents of the negotiated governance model, who either
ignore the incompleteness inherent in the contractual metaphor they adopt or
welcome such incompleteness as an opportunity for collaboration and
cooperation among interested public and private parties.
In short, the incompleteness of law creates room for interpretation and
manipulation by a variety of public and private actors. As such, it presents a
political opportunity for those with a stake in regulation to push their agenda
through renegotiation during the implementation and enforcement phases of
governance by constructing a gap-filling interpretation that serves the
group’s self-interest. This gap filling proves to be an important mechanism
by which various actors outside of the regulated organization (for example,
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lawyers and consultants) and within it (for example, senior management,
internal compliance and human resources personnel, and in-house legal
departments) advance their own interests.
Notably, however, the interest groups most conspicuously
underrepresented during this process are those that may represent the public
interest.188 To the extent that public involvement in the political process may
enhance the content of legal policy, therefore, this situation should cause a
re-evaluation of the mechanisms by which legal and political institutions in
the United States confront the problem of incomplete law.
A few caveats are necessarily in order. First, most negotiated governance
theories embrace self-regulatory mechanisms other than internal compliance
structures, such as industry standard setting and cooperative approaches to
enforcement, that are not specifically addressed in this Article.189 However,
the poor empirical showing of internal compliance structures, combined with
the opportunities (highlighted by the Incomplete Contracts Governance
Theory) for private parties to appropriate any social benefits created by legal
policy, should cause a more cautious approach to such proposals than is
currently evidenced in the legal literature.
Second, the Incomplete Contracts Governance Theory is developed
primarily by reference to the rise of internal compliance structures as a
liability determinant under EEO law. Other legal regimes that embrace
internal compliance structures as a liability determinant may have developed
through different mechanisms. For example, the OSGs and some, but not all,
aspects of corporate and securities law relating to internal compliance
developed primarily through legislative and administrative action, rather than
through judicial interpretation, as did much of EEO law.
Nonetheless, these differences should not be overstated. For example,
although the OSG recommendations were promulgated by the Federal
Sentencing Commission (with substantial input and influence from the
Business Roundtable), as originally enacted they were notoriously
incomplete, requiring substantial interpretation by legal compliance
professionals and business organizations.190 In addition, as discussed in Part
III, regulatory agencies, courts, and legislatures have all embraced internal
188. Professors Ayres and Braithwaite have also noted that representatives of the public are
typically unrepresented in many aspects of the governance process and have advocated the
development of political and legal structures that include them in ex-post governance. See AYRES &
BRAITHWAITE, supra note 9, at 57-60 (noting that Tripartism involves “unlocking to PIGs the smokefilled rooms where the real business of regulation is transacted.”).
189. See, e.g., Freeman, Private Role, supra note 10; AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 9.
190. See Note, supra 8, at 1786 (stating that “critics assert that the Guidelines provide inadequate
guidance for corporations seeking compliance.”).
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compliance structures in a wide variety of legal fields without evaluating the
evidence concerning their lack of efficacy in deterring prohibited conduct,
indicating that all three political branches may suffer from substantial
shortcomings when attempting to implement cooperative approaches to the
regulation of business organizations.
Finally, one should not rule out an attitudinal component to the results
discussed in this Article. If judges and regulatory agencies are reluctant to
impose liability in certain cases based on personal policy preferences—for
example, a belief that employment discrimination suits are often meritless or
that organizational entities should not be subjected to criminal liability—then
they may be more likely to approve largely symbolic attempts at compliance
in those types of cases than in others.

